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Work Opportunity Tax Credit and the Welfare-to-Work Tax 
Credit), significant institutional obstacles stand in the way of 
comprehensive reform. The Article ends with a discussion of 
the type of fundamental structural reforms that will be needed 
before meaningful legislative oversight of functionally related 
government programs can be achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A new framework for management and oversight of federal gov-
ernment programs is emerging under the Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993 ("Results Act" or "GPRA").1 The Results Act 
is part of a broader "government reinvention" reform effort2 and 
movement toward performance review of government programs. 
The Act requires federal agencies to prepare performance goals and 
plans covering budget-listed program activities,3 and to measure and 
report program "outputs" and "outcomes',.i to the Office of Manage-
1. Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (codified in scattered sections 
of 5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.). See Paul R. Verkuil, Is Efficient Gov-
ernment an Oxymoron?, 43 DUKE L.J. 1221, 1235 (1994) (describing the Results 
Act as "little-noticed" legislation with "potentially radical reform possibilities"). 
For a discussion of the political impetus behind the Results Act, which grew out 
of regulatory initiatives begun during the Reagan administration and was first 
introduced during the Bush administration, see infra Part I.A. As discussed 
infra in Part LB, the Results Act initially provided for implementation through 
pilot programs. Its performance management requirements have more gener-
ally been in effect since 1997. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1118, 1119 (1994). 
2. Government reinvention reforms, which have been implemented in the 
United States and abroad, have been described as follows: 
Although the rhetoric might have varied around the world, most of the 
recent efforts at governmental reinvention, restructuring, and renewal 
have shared similar goals-to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the public sector, enhance the responsiveness of public agencies to 
their clients and customers, reduce public expenditure, and improve 
managerial accountability. The choice of policy instruments has also 
been remarkably similar: commercialisation, corporatisation, and pri-
vatisation; the devolution of management responsibilities; a shift from 
input controls to output and outcome measures; tighter performance 
specification; and more extensive contracting out. 
JONATHAN BOSTON ET AL., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE NEW ZEALAND MODEL 2 
(1996). See also, e.g., COLIN CAMPBELL & GRAHAM K WILSON, THE END OF 
WHITEHALL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 90 (1995) (describing Britain and New 
Zealand as having made the greatest changes, followed by Australia, and then 
by the relatively modest reforms implemented by Canada). 
3. Under the Results Act, federal agencies are required to prepare multi-
year strategic plans and annual performance plans and reports covering each of 
their program activities listed in the annual budget. 5 U.S.C. § 306 (1994); 31 
U.S.C. § 1115(a), (f)(6) (1994). 
4. The performance plans must "establish performance indicators to be 
used in measuring or assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and out-
comes of each program activity." 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(4). An "output measure" 
is the "tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort and can be ex-
pressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner." Id. at§ 1115(f)(3). An "out-
come measure" is defined as "an assessment of the results of a program activity 
compared to its intended purpose." Id. at§ 1115(f)(2). As discussed infra in 
754 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
ment and Budget ("0Ml3") and to Congress. In addition, it requires 
the president's annual budget submission to include a government-
wide performance plan.5 
This Article examines the Results Act's performance manage-
ment and budgeting requirements and outlines the type of addi-
tional reforms that will be needed before meaningful review of func-
tionally related government programs can be achieved. The Results 
Act offers a framework for assessing the performance of traditional 
federal programs or services provided by government agencies as 
well as programs or financial assistance provided through various 
alternative, more private or decentralized mechanisms-including 
tax incentives used to encourage private businesses or individuals to 
engage in certain socially or economically desirable activities. The 
Act thus provides a new opportunity to address the difficult man-
agement and oversight problems caused by the availability of alter-
native program funding and implementation mechanisms. As expe-
rience with prior reform efforts has shown, significant institutional 
obstacles stand in the way of achieving comprehensive Results Act 
reforms. The following introductory sections provide additional 
background and further define the focus of discussion for the re-
mainder of the Article. 
A. Government Reinvention: Managing for Results 
The Results Act performance management requirements are 
related to a broader reform movement, at the state and local level6 
as well as at national7 and international levels, 8 encompassing mul-
Parts I and IV, identifying and measuring appropriate "outputs" and "out-
comes" for government programs can be quite difficult to accomplish. 
5. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a)(28) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring the president's 
budget submission to Congress to include a "performance plan for the overall 
budget as provided for under section 1115"). Programs are listed in the per-
formance plan under certain functional categories used in the budget (including 
national defense, agriculture, housing and commerce, education, training, em-
ployment and social services, and income security), according to the program's 
major purpose. See 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(l) (1994); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GoVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET 
SYSTEM CONCEPTS AND GLOSSARY 451 (2000) [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 2001]. 
6. See, e.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GoVERNMENT: 
How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPmIT IS TRANSFOIDtfiNG THE PuBLIC SECTOR 138-65 
(1992). 
7. Implementation of the Results Act has been incorporated into the 
Clinton administration's reinvention initiative, the National Partnership for 
Reinventing Government ("NPR"), formerly the National Performance Review, 
as part of its program of "empowering employees to get results." NATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GoVERNMENT 
THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 72-73 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS] (specifying that the Gov-
ernment Performance and Results Act be implemented as an action to be taken 
to hold federal employees accountable for results). The NPR is an interagency 
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tifaceted and sometimes conflicting public sector trends toward par-
ticipatory and market-based models, government downsizing, decen-
tralization, and greater administrative flexibility and accountabil-
ity.9 Because of the multifaceted forces behind the "reinvention" 
movement, the "reinvention" rhetoric accommodates a broad range 
of political objectives,10 business management and assessment prac-
task force led by Vice President Al Gore, which is designed to "reinvent gov-
ernment to work better, cost less, and get results Americans care about." Vice 
President Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government (visited on 
Aug. 1, 2000) <http://www.npr.gov/library/vision2000.html>. For a preliminary 
assessment of the federal government's "reinvention" reform efforts, see 
DONALD F. KETTL, REINVENTING GoVERNMENT: A FIFTH-YEAR REPORT CARD v-ix 
(1998), and John J. Dululio, Jr., Works Better and Costs Less? Sweet and Sour 
Perspectives on the NPR, in INSIDE THE REINVENTION MACIIlNE: APPRAISING 
GoVERNMENTAL REFORM 1, 5-6 (Donald F. Kettl & John J. Dilulio, Jr. eds., 
1995). 
8. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
("OECD"), IN SEARCH OF RESULTS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1997) 
(describing performance management practices in Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States); OECD, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN GoVERNl\IENT: 
CONTEMPORARY ILLUSTRATIONS (1996) (containing studies of public sector re-
forms in New Zealand, Sweden, the United States, and the Netherlands); 
OECD, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN GoVERNl\'.IENT: PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT AND RESULTS-ORIENTED MANAGE1'.IENT (1994) (discussing per-
formance measurement systems adopted by OECD countries). 
9. See, e.g., B. GUY PETERS, THE FuTURE OF GoVERNING: FOUR EMERGING 
MODELS 2, 13-20 (1996). 
10. Politicians from both major parties in the United States have built on 
popular support for the view, expressed by President Reagan in his first inau-
gural address, that "government is not the solution to our problem; government 
is the problem." Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), in PuBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN, 1981: 
JANUARY 20 TO DECE1IBER 31, 1981, at 1 (1981). President Clinton echoed ele-
ments of that perspective when he announced in his 1996 State of the Union 
address that "[t]he era of big Government is over," explaining that the admini-
stration had "worked to give the American people a smaller, less bureaucratic 
Government in Washington." William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Ses-
sion of Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996), in 1 PuBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON, 1996: JANUARY 1 
TO JUNE 30, 1996, at 79 (1997). 
Unlike Republican reinvention advocates, the New Democrats tend to em-
phasize practical solutions rather than ideology. See Christopher H. Schroeder, 
Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 801, 807-09, 822-23 (2000) 
(contrasting the Clinton administration's nonideological "third wa-y" approach 
with the efforts to articulate a coherent third way political ideology in Great 
Britain and Europe as an "alternative to socialism arid communism, on the one 
hand, and neoliberal free market capitalism, on the other hand"). Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore has led the Clinton administration's reinvention efforts by empha-
sizing the need to cut bureaucratic red tape and to focus on what "work[s] bet-
ter, [and] cost[s] less." Vice President Al Gore's National Partnership for 
Reinventing Government, supra note 7. Performance management reforms, if 
successfully implemented, could facilitate the reevaluation of government-
funded programs in a period of decentralization, devolution, and downsizing. 
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tices, 11 and views about the appropriate level of legislative oversight 
of executive agencies.12 Nevertheless, the reform trends generally 
mark a shift in management focus from program inputs (such as 
staff supervised, equipment purchased, or grants dispensed) to pro-
gram outputs or outcomes, that is, on "results."13 
This new focus on program results coincides with the more gen-
eralized public law shift from New Deal-type centrally managed fed-
eral programs and command-and-control regulatory models to de-
centralized devolution and market-based models, in which federally 
funded programs are managed by state or local government officials 
or are contracted out-sometimes in conjunction with nonprofit or-
ganizations or private contractors, or by quasi-governmental bod-
ies.14 Reinvention advocates argue that, in this decentralized envi-
ronment, a management system based on results makes more sense 
than one based on hierarchical process or input controls on the 
management of equipment, staff, and budgets.15 
Although reinvention initiatives involving new regulatory mod-
els have been the subject of a growing body of commentary from the 
legal academy,16 relatively little attention has been paid, outside of 
At the same time, if the New Democrats are correct, the reforms may blunt 
some of the conservative ideological arguments against big government. 
11. See, e.g., VICE PRESIDENT AL GoRE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, 
BUSINESSLIKE GoVERNMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AMERICA'S BEST COMPANIES 
(1997) (describing employee empowerment and customer-centered management 
practices); OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 6, at 159-180 (describing Total 
Quality Management ("TQM"), as a set of initiatives for increased quality and 
"customer" awareness in public and private organizations, derived from the 
writings of W. Edwards Deming and others). 
12. Reinvention initiatives such as the National Performance Review and 
the Results Act reflect different views about the roles of the executive and leg-
islative in controlling the bureaucracy. See, e.g., Gerald Garvey, False Prom-
ises: The NPR in Historical Perspective, in INSIDE THE REINVENTION MACHINE: 
APPRAISING GoVERNMENTAL REFORM, supra note 7, at 87, 87-106; see also, e.g., 
Donald F. Kettl, Building Lasting Reform: Enduring Questions, Missing An-
swers, in INSIDE THE REINVENTION MACHINE: APPRAISING GoVERNMENTAL 
REFORM, supra note 7, at 9, 9-83 [hereinafter Building Lasting Reform]; discus-
sion infra Part I.A. 
13. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 6, at 139. 
14. See Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the 
Nineties, 45 FLA. L. REv. 1, 5, 7-8, 11-12 (1993); see also, e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, 
JR. ET AL., IMPROVING GoVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: AN OWNER'S MANuAL 39-40 
(1993); Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional 
Choice and Government Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 945, 946-48, 952-53, 956, 966-67 (1997). 
15. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 6, at 139. 
16. For discussion of "reinvention" initiatives focusing on the regulatory 
process, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regu-
latory State, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1995) (describing Reagan, Bush, and 
Clinton administration executive orders asserting centralized control over the 
regulatory process and evaluating Clinton's executive order as part of a "rein-
venting government" program). See also, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regula-
tions: The National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 
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government circles, to initiatives involving performance manage-
ment. As explained below, however, the emerging Results Act per-
formance-based framework should prompt new thinking about the 
difficult management and oversight problems posed by functionally 
substitutable program funding and implementation mechanisms. 
B. Program Funding and Implementation: Direct Expenditures, 
Tax Expenditures, and Regulatory Programs 
Federal programs can be funded and implemented directly or 
indirectly. Programs are implemented and funded most directly, 
and visibly, through traditional tax-and-spend programs.17 Whether 
run directly by government agencies or contracted out to others, 
these programs involve the direct expenditure of federal revenues 
raised through taxation and include discretionary18 and mandatory 
(including entitlements such as social security and Medicare) 
spending programs.19 Discretionary programs, which are funded 
through the annual appropriations process, are subject to budget 
43 DUKE L.J. 1165 (1994) (describing regulatory reform recommendations); 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in 
the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 406 
(1996) (criticizing both executive managerial and legislative regulatory reform 
initiatives). Much of the legal commentary on new regulatory models has fo-
cused on efforts to "reinvent" environmental regulation. See, e.g., Schroeder, 
supra note 10, at 820, 822-23 (discussing use of market-based incentives and 
information disclosure as alternatives to or supplements to traditional com-
mand-and-control regulation). 
17. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET, in BUDGET, FY 2001, 
supra note 5, at 8. 
18. Discretionary spending is further divided into the categories of defense 
and non-defense discretionary spending. The fiscal year 2001 federal budget 
documents estimate that defense discretionary spending will total an estimated 
16% of all federal spending, or $292 billion out of a total $1835 billion ($1.8 tril-
lion) federal expenditures. See id. at 10-11. Non-defense discretionary spend-
ing, which includes a wide range of programs, including education, training, 
employment, social services, housing, energy, transportation, science, and for-
eign aid, is estimated to comprise approximately 19% of all federal spending, or 
$348.65 billion out of a total $1835 billion ($1.8 trillion) federal expenditures. 
See id. 
19. Mandatory spending, sometimes called "direct spending," refers to 
spending that is not controlled through appropriations. It includes the largest 
entitlement programs, social security and Medicare, as well as means-tested 
entitlement programs (including Medicaid, food stamps, and other programs for 
low-income families and individuals), and other mandatory spending (including 
interest payments and federal retirement and insurance programs). Entitle-
ment spending is largely determined by eligibility and benefits formulas. The 
fiscal year 2001 federal budget estimates that social security will account for 
23% of all federal spending and that Medicare will account for 12% of federal 
spending. See id. at 10-11. Medicaid accounts for 7% of federal spending, other 
means-tested entitlements account for 6% of federal spending, net interest 
payments on federal debt accounts for 11 % of spending, and other mandatory 
spending comprise the remaining 6% of the federal budget. See id. 
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process discretionary spending caps20 and comprise a shrinking por-
tion of the overall federal budget.21 By contrast, entitlements, which 
are not funded through the appropriations process, account for a 
growing share of federal spending.22 
Federal programs can also be funded and implemented indi-
rectly, either through provisions in the tax code or by way of gov-
ernment regulation. Although much of the tax code is designed to 
raise revenue or to accomplish specific tax policy objectives, many 
tax provisions involve "tax expenditures."23 These tax expenditure 
provisions represent a form of government spending because they 
reduce the tax revenue that would otherwise be collected absent the 
tax expenditure provision.24 This type of government spending may 
take the form of permanent exclusions from income, deductions, de-
ferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special tax rates.25 
20. See 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1994) (providing for statutory discretionary spend-
ing caps). Discretionary spending caps are implemented through the budget 
and appropriations processes. The congressional budget committees draft 
budget resolutions, which establish a total amount that can be expended for 
discretionary programs during the year. House and Senate appropriations 
committees allocate these totals among their subcommittees. The budget proc-
ess keeps score of spending, and provides for various procedural mechanisms to 
enforce the spending caps set by the budget resolution. If appropriations exceed 
the statutory discretionary caps, the excess is eliminated by sequestering re-
sources in programs that are funded in the spending category in which the 
overage occurred. For additional discussion, see infra Part II.C. 
21. Nondefense discretionary spending comprised 23% of the budget in 
1966, compared to less than 19% projected for fiscal year 2001. See A CITIZEN'S 
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at 11. 
22. See id. at 10-11. 
23. See STANLEY s. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF 
TAX EXPENDITURES vii (1973) [hereinafter PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM]. 
24. A central insight of the tax expenditure concept is that financial assis-
tance can be delivered to a particular industry, activity, or class of persons 
through the tax system. Tax expenditures, thus, are viewed as functionally 
equivalent to spending programs. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. 
McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1-30 (1985) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURES]; 
PATHWAYSTOTAXREFORM, supra note 23, at 6, 30-49; see also U.S. DEP'TOFTHE 
TREAsURY, .ANNuAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF 
THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1968, Doc. No. 3245, 35-36, 
322 (1969). For discussion of tax expenditure analysis, including the difficulty 
of defining a "tax expenditure," see infra Part II.B. 
25. Surrey and McDaniel, leading tax expenditure theorists, have ex-
plained the concept as follows: 
The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of 
two distinct elements. The first element consists of structural provi-
sions necessary to implement a normal income tax, such as the defini-
tion of net income, the specification of accounting rules, the determi-
nation of the entities subject to tax, the determination of the rate 
schedule and exemption levels, and the application of the tax to inter-
national transactions. These provisions compose the revenue-raising 
aspects of the tax. The second element consists of the special prefer-
ences found in every income tax. These provisions, often called tax in-
centives or tax subsidies, are departures from the normal tax struc-
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Whatever their form, tax expenditures represent government 
spending effected through the tax system rather than through direct 
grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.26 Thus, in 
addition to its revenue-raising function, the tax system plays a role 
as a funding and delivery mechanism for certain government pro-
grams. 
Although a listing of tax expenditures has been required as part 
of federal budget submissions since 1974,27 and newly enacted tax 
provisions have been subject to "pay-as-you-go" budget process re-
forms since 1990,28 the funding of tax expenditures by foregone 
revenue tends to be less publicly visible than the funding of discre-
tionary spending programs. Tax expenditures, like entitlements, 
are not subject to the appropriations process.29 Both tax expendi-
tures and entitlements are part of the jurisdiction of the congres-
sional tax-writing committees. 30 Outlay equivalents of tax expendi-
ture and are designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class 
of persons. . . . [T]hese departures from the normative tax structure 
represent government spending for favored activities or groups, ef-
fected through the tax system. 
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 3. 
26. Tax e:iqlenditures involve two payments: "the imputed tax payment that 
would have been made in the absence of the special provision (all else remain-
ing the same) and the simultaneous expenditure of that payment as a direct 
grant to the person benefited by the special provision." PATHWAYS TO TAX 
REFORM, supra note 23, at 6-7. 
27. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). Tax expenditures are listed in the president's annual 
budget submission according to their budget function, in budget categories such 
as national defense, agriculture, housing and commerce, education, and income 
security. The deduction for home mortgage interest, for example, is listed un-
der housing and commerce. Tax expenditure budgets, prepared by both the ex-
ecutive and the legislative branches, are used primarily for informational pur-
poses. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
28. See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (establishing the "pay-as-you-go" 
budget requirement that tax changes resulting in revenue loss be paid for by 
tax increases, by reductions in current tax subsidies, or by certain direct 
spending reductions in entitlement programs). For further discussion of "pay-
as-you-go" budget requirements (also referred to as "paygo"), see discussion in-
fra Part II.C. 
29. See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal 
Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 903 (1999). 
30. The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees have ju-
risdiction over tax provisions as well as major entitlement programs, including 
social security, Medicare, and numerous other programs providing social wel-
fare benefits. See COMJ.\I. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, 105TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1998 GREENBOOK: BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMl.\llTTEE 
ON WAYS AND MEANS 836 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, 1998 GREENBOOK]. 
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tures31 now exceed the total amount of discretionary spending 
funded through the appropriations process32 and, like entitlements, 
comprise an expanding part of overall federal expenditures. 33 
Programs also may be implemented through regulation, which 
can have an effect economically equivalent to a tax on those regu-
lated.34 The public policy implications of the functional substitut-
ability of taxation and regulation,35 as well as the related intergov-
ernmental issue of federal regulatory programs and unfunded 
31. The president's annual budget includes a listing of tax expenditures 
computed as outlay equivalents. Outlay equivalents estimate the amount of to-
tal direct outlays necessary to place taxpayers in the same after-tax position as 
they would be under a tax expenditure. The outlay equivalent may be greater 
than the revenue loss from a tax expenditure, for example, if the outlay would 
be included in the taxable income of the recipients. 
32. Because of the way tax expenditures are measured, comparisons of ag-
gregate tax expenditure revenue losses with total discretionary spending 
amounts should be made with caution. The budget documents estimate fiscal 
year 2001 outlay equivalent revenue loss from tax expenditures totaling over 
$661 billion, which exceeds the combined amount for defense and nondefense 
discretionary spending. See BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at 382 tbl.32-4, 388 
n.* (noting that, "[b]ecause of interactions across provisions, these estimates are 
only rough approximations of the total revenue loss for the functions"). This 
continues a pattern that has been observed in past years. See Harry L. Gut-
man, Refiections on the Process of Enacting Tax Law, 86 TAX NOTES 93, 94 
(2000) (citing budget figures for fiscal year 1999); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure 
Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HAsTINGS L.J. 407, 408 (1999) (noting 
that "the federal government spent more money through the [tax] [c]ode [in 
1998] than through the discretionary appropriations process"). 
33. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX 
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 34-37, 35 tbl.1.4, 183 
(1997) (concluding that tax expenditures function like budgetary entitlements; 
since 1975, the "hidden welfare state" of tax expenditures has grown faster than 
the "visible welfare state" expenditures for income security, health, housing, 
etc.). 
34. See MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN 
REGULATION AND TAXATION 1 (1999); see also, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous 
Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 653-69 
(2000) (citing law and economics literature on the analogy oflegal rules to taxa-
tion and highlighting certain measurement difficulties in evaluating the effi-
ciency and equity oflegal rules). 
35. As Professor Kelman notes in his discussion of regulation as an alterna-
tive to taxation, "[a]t times, this interchangeability or substitutability of taxa-
tion and regulation is quite transparent, and it is debated publicly whether cer-
tain regulatory mandates ought to be thought of as new taxes." KELMAN, supra 
note 34, at 2 (discussing, as an example, a proposed health reform employer 
mandate to provide health insurance for uncovered employees). "At other 
times, this functional interchangeability may be less transparent but no less 
real." Id. at 3. In addition, as Kelman points out, governments can charge user 
fees for government services or allow private parties to bear losses or insurance 
costs rather than to expend public funds to prevent losses. Id. at 3-4. He 
states, "[w]hile not identical to substituting regulatory for public tax-and-spend 
programs, user fees and deliberate inaction also represent alternative solutions 
to public policy problems." Id. at 4. 
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mandates,36 have provoked much controversy and commentary. At 
the most transparent and direct level, however, federal agencies 
with responsibility for implementing regulatory programs are cre-
ated and funded through the authorization and appropriations proc-
ess.37 
Appropriately tailored tax expenditures or regulations can be 
used as alternatives to, or in combination with, direct expenditures 
to achieve particular governmental goals.38 Although tax expendi-
tures, regulatory programs, and direct eA'Penditures can be substi-
tuted for each other from a functional design perspective,39 they each 
operate in distinct institutional settings. 
The markedly different political, budgetary, and institutional 
consequences of these otherwise interchangeable mechanisms pro-
vide policymakers with great flexibility in designing programs, but 
they also create enormous challenges for the effective management 
and oversight of functionally related government programs. The fo-
cus here ·will be on the institutional challenges posed by perform-
ance-based review of tax expenditures and their direct expenditure 
program alternatives. 
C. The Need for Comprehensive Coverage 
Although reinvention advocates show strategic awareness of the 
various means used by governments to achieve programmatic 
36. See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and 
Other Regulations, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 351 (1999); Edward A. Zelinsky, Un-
funded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public 
Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 V AND. L. REV. 1355 (1993). 
37. See Pete V. Domenici, Fighting the Good Fight: Washington's Quest for 
a Balanced Budget, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 17, 19 (1996). 
38. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 56-57 (3d ed. 1995) (listing a vari-
ety of public-law and private-law mechanisms that the government could use to 
accomplish its goals, including tax deductions or credits, grants, production 
quotas, regulation, revision of legal rules or imposition of criminal sanctions, 
and raising efficacy and equity issues about the various choices). 
39. Suppose, for example, that Congress determined that it would be "in 
the national interest to reduce the consumption of home heating fuels by en-
couraging" increased thermal efficiency in residential housing. Id. at 56. Con-
gress could enact an "income tax credit equal to [the first] 15 percent of the first 
$2,000 of [qualified] 'energy conservation expenditures,' ... estimated to reduce 
federal revenues by more than $600 million a year ... [or provide] an income 
ta'>'. deduction that would result in an equivalent revenue loss." Id. The income 
ta'>'. credit or deduction could be provided either to homeowners or to producers 
of thermal efficiency products (manufacturers of insulation or storm windows, 
for example). Alternatively, Congress could (1) "[p]rovide individuals [with] a 
direct subsidy equal to 15 percent of the first $2,000 of their expenditures" for 
qualified energy conservation expenditures, or (2) provide manufacturers of 
thermal efficiency equipment with "direct subsidies totaling $600 million," or (3) 
prohibit the distribution of federal funds to any locality whose housing code 
regulations do not require a certain minimum thermal efficiency, or (4) "require 
a 'thermal efficiency certificate' to be provided to all purchasers of housing." Id. 
762 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
goals,40 most have paid little attention to achieving comprehensive 
coverage for performance-based reforms. They have focused pri-
marily on the need for performance-based review of traditional tax-
and-spend government programs and on implementing new regula-
tory models. This leaves out tax expenditures, which, as explained 
above, comprise a large and expanding category of government-
funded programs. This Article explains the need for an expanded 
focus, describes efforts made so far to broaden the reach of the per-
formance management requirements, and identifies the types of in-
stitutional obstacles that must be overcome if the Results Act is to 
achieve more comprehensive coverage. 
The failure of most reinvention advocates to focus on the per-
formance of tax expenditures may be explained in part by the no-
tion, shared by many in politics and business, that tax expenditures, 
like tax cuts, reduce the size of government.41 For those who believe 
that tax expenditures are largely self-administered by taxpayers 
and, thus, permit less government involvement, the increased use of 
tax expenditures is consistent with a perceived need for government 
downsizing. Alternatively, and more cynically, if the president and 
members of Congress believe that channeling subsidies through the 
tax code creates the appearance of reducing the size of government-
even though they know that tax expenditures do not really shrink 
government-reinvention politics may lead to the same result.42 
Nevertheless, gaps in coverage tend to invite circumvention of 
reforms through a gradual shifting of programs and resources into 
less visible or accountable alternatives. Failure to evaluate the per-
formance of tax-delivered programs would, over time, undermine the 
central reinvention goal of making government more accountable for 
results. Tax expenditures, once enacted, should be evaluated under 
standards applicable to functionally related direct expenditures; 
thus, they should be fully incorporated into the Results Act per-
formance review process. 
40. Reinvention advocates urge experimentation with alternatives to gov-
ernment-provided services. See, e.g., OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 6, at app. 
A (listing alternatives to service delivery by government employees, including 
regulation or deregulation, monitoring or investigation, legal rules or sanctions, 
licensing, tax policy, grants, subsidies, loans, loan guarantees, contracting, 
franchising, public-private partnerships, public-public partnerships, quasi-
public or private corporations, public enterprise, procurement, insurance, re-
wards, changing public investment policy, technical assistance, information, re-
ferral, volunteers, vouchers, impact fees, catalyzing nongovernmental efforts, 
quid pro quos, restructuring the marketplace, or the sale, exchange or use of 
property). 
41. See discussion infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
42. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 
UCLA L. Rev. 1861, 1926-33 (1994) (discussing political constraints on fiscal 
policies due to the prominence of the budget deficit and public perceptions about 
the size of government). 
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D. The Need for New Ways for Congress to Structure Program 
Oversight 
763 
As mentioned above, some of the problems caused by the substi-
tutability of program funding and implementing mechanisms can be 
addressed by ensuring comprehensive coverage of Results Act re-
forms. Some obstacles to reform are so deeply embedded in the con-
gressional committee jurisdictional divisions and budgetary proc-
esses, however, that they will require new thinking about 
congressional oversight and budgetary structures. These problems 
are more intractable. Although the Results Act requires new execu-
tive branch reporting and coordination procedures,43 it attempts no 
major restructuring of congressional processes. These Results Act 
requirements, once in place, may prompt discussion of workable 
ways to modify program oversight structures. Although the primary 
focus of this Article is on incorporating tax expenditures into the Re-
sults Act performance review process, the Article suggests the type 
of fundamental structural reforms that should be considered in the 
future. 
E. Plan of Discussion 
This Article is organized into four parts. Part I describes the 
Results Act performance management and budgeting reforms in 
greater detail after briefly summarizing the theoretical ideas and 
political impetus behind them. 
Part II examines the efforts made so far to incorporate tax ex-
penditures into the emerging Results Act performance review proc-
ess44 and places these developments into context by recounting expe-
rience with past efforts at tax expenditure reform. That experience 
also provides important lessons about the obstacles ahead for 
broader Results Act reforms. 
For readers unfamiliar with tax expenditure reform, Part II 
provides a brief explanation of tax expenditure theory and the over-
all impact of its program for legislative reform. Part II then exam-
ines the budget and tax reform ideas of tax expenditure analysis 
more closely, focusing on legislative process proposals, such as sun-
set provisions, aimed at triggering more meaningful congressional 
review of tax expenditures.45 It describes early experience with 
43. See discussion infra Part LB. 
44. Steps are being taken, first through pilot studies to establish frame-
works for review and next through improved data development, to facilitate a 
more systematic performance review of ta....: expenditures. See discussion infra 
Part II.A. 
45. Leading tax expenditure theorists have argued that tax expenditures 
should be identified and included in budget policy analysis as a means of con-
trolling federal expenditures. They also have argued for the elimination, when-
ever feasible, of tax expenditures from the tax system and, where appropriate, 
replacement by direct expenditure programs. Accordingly, unlike reinvention 
reformers, tax expenditure reformers have emphasized the tax system benefits 
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these reforms and. the obstacles that blocked full implementation. 
Part II ends witli a discussion of how intervening budget procedures 
have made reform more difficult by increasing the separation be-
tween tax expenditures and discretionary programs for purposes of 
policy analysis. 
Part III discusses recent experience with congressional review 
of tax expenditures and functionally-related direct expenditures by 
examining employment subsidy programs. These programs, which 
include employer tax credits for wages paid to certain low-income 
workers-the welfare-to-work tax credit,46 the work opportunity tax 
credit, 47 and their predecessors-provide an important example of 
the institutional obstacles ahead for the Results Act. Although 
these programs provide employment subsidies to private employers 
through the income tax code, they have not been self-administering. 
Experience with tax credits, which have been regularly sunsetted 
and then extended, shows why tax expenditure analysis has been 
more effective as a change agent for budgetary analysis than as a 
tool for achieving meaningful program management and oversight. 
Part III also illustrates how past efforts at reform have failed to 
achieve integrated performance review by Congress of both tax ex-
penditure and direct expenditure programs.48 
Part N discusses the implications of the failed reform efforts 
and analyzes prospects for more meaningful review of a broad range 
of federally funded programs under evolving Results Act reforms. 
Emerging efforts to incorporate performance review of tax expendi-
tures into the performance-based management and oversight proc-
ess provide a promising executive branch mechanism-through 
agency performance management and preparation of the president's 
annual budget-for achieving more coordinated review of related 
government programs. The government-wide, performance-based 
measurement and reporting process should generate information 
about a broad range of previously unexamined programs. Program 
performance information is less likely to be used as a budget dodge 
than mechanical rules, like sunset provisions. Nevertheless, as 
Parts II and III reveal, budget rules and congressional committee 
jurisdictional divisions make it quite difficult to achieve a coordi-
to be gained from reducing the number of tax expenditures in the tax code. 
Fewer tax expenditures in the tax code, leading tax expenditure theorists have 
argued, would lead to a more equitable, more efficient, and less complex tax 
system. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
46. See I.R.C. § 51A (West Supp. 2000). 
47. See id.§ 51. 
48. As used here, "performance review" refers to an evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of a program or subsidy in meeting its goals. An integrated perform-
ance review refers to an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of pro-
viding the subsidy through the income tax code (\vith or without time limits) 
versus providing it via a discretionary spending program, an entitlement, or 
through a regulatory program. 
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nated review of functionally related direct expenditures and tax ex-
penditures. In the absence of adequate congressional structures to 
respond to the Results Act program performance information pro-
vided by the executive branch, the information will not lead to more 
effective congressional oversight of tax expenditures or related (or 
alternative) spending programs. 
This Article closes with an example of the type of congressional 
structural and jurisdictional coordination reforms that should be 
considered as a next-stage reinvention reform, and raises questions 
for future analysis and development. As we enter a period of bal-
anced budgets (and surpluses) for the first time since 1969, 49 the 
changing budgetary and political environment eliminates much of 
the consensus that led to the budget process rules, nominally in ef-
fect through 2002.50 Increased budgetary flexibility should permit 
more pragmatic attention to these issues, but it remains to be seen 
whether both Congress and executive agencies will follow through 
on the performance management and oversight reforms begun pur-
suant to the Results Act. 
The incremental development of a responsive performance-
based review system by Congress could provide an opportunity for 
more coordinated review of programs delivered by government 
49. The surplus reflects cash flow accounting for governmental receipts and 
payments. This cash flow measure has been criticized as an arbitrary concept, 
which fails to reflect real economic values or policy commitments for the future. 
See, e.g., LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING: KNOWING WHO 
PAYS, AND WHEN, FOR WHAT WE SPEND 143-63 (1992) (arguing in favor of an al-
ternative measure which describes the government's treatment of current and 
prospective generations over their lifetimes); DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICITS 
MATTER? 65-150 (1997) (reviewing the debate in economic literature about the 
deficit); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule: 
Looking for an Economically Meaningful Way to Assess Fiscal Policy, in 
GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING AROUND THE WORLD 9, 10-11 (Alan J. Auerbach et 
al. eds., 1999) (discussing arbitrary nature of government deficits). 
50. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 10201-205, 111 
Stat. 697-702 (extending discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go re-
quirements until October 1, 2002, and to 2003 for e:i..'J)enditures for highways 
and mass transit); ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 
5, at ch. 13, 285-91 (discussing the allocation of the surplus to "complement 
BEA restraints" in the BEA preview report); cf., e.g., Bud Newman, U.S. 
Budget: Clinton's Budget Extends Pay-Go Rules But Uses Surplus to Fund His 
Tax Cuts, 26 DAILY T.A."'C REP. (BNA) GG-7 (Feb. 8, 2000) (noting that the ad-
ministration's fiscal 2001 budget documents do not explain how its apparently 
contradictory surplus allocations and the current budget rules could coexist); 
Bud Newman, U.S. Budget: Pay-As-You-Go Rules Are Irrelevant, Ways and 
Means Staffer Tells ABA, 94 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-3 (May 15, 2000) (report-
ing observations by congressional staff that the budget surplus has eliminated 
the congressional consensus that kept pay-go on the books, that the discretion-
ary spending caps have had more influence than pay-go, and that the latest 
budget restriction to have an impact on potential tax code changes is the under-
standing that neither tax cuts nor entitlement spending can result in the use of 
the social security surplus). 
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through direct spending as well as through the tax system. The al-
tered fiscal environment presents an opportunity for movement 
away from the deficit-driven budgetary game-playing that has 
dominated the legislative process for the last fifteen years.51 How 
Congress responds to the program performance information pro-
vided by the Treasury and other executive agencies in the budget 
and program oversight process poses a central challenge for the fu-
ture. 
I. THE GoVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993: 
AN OVERVIEW 
This Part provides an overview of the Results Act and describes 
the progress made so far in implementing it. The Results Act cre-
ates a framework for reviewing government programs based on their 
results and, thus, provides an opportunity for more systematic as-
sessment of the performance of tax expenditures as well as direct 
expenditures. The next Part of this Article describes efforts made so 
far to incorporate tax expenditures into the performance review pro-
cess. The following sections provide background information for 
that discussion by setting forth the theoretical and political ideas 
behind government reinvention and the Results Act, and by outlin-
ing the Results Act performance-based criteria and the performance 
management and budgeting goals and timetables. 
A. The Theoretical and Political Ideas Behind Reinvention 
Initiatives 
Because the politics and rhetoric behind reinvention initiatives 
encompass multiple views about what is wrong with government, 
and sometimes conflicting conceptions about how the public sector 
should be organized, reinvention initiatives in this country tend to 
lack theoretical coherence.52 However, some of the performance-
51. For a discussion of the effect of budget reforms on the ta.x legislative 
process, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 
186-88 (1997) (describing in general the adverse effects of budget politics on tax 
legislation in the decade following 1986); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Poli-
tics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. 
Cm. L. REV. 501, 503-04 (1998) [hereinafter Harnessing Politics] (viewing the 
changes more positively); :Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmak-
ing, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 668 n.132 (1995) [hereinafter Paint-by-Numbers] 
(citing economic literature on the problems created by the use of revenue esti-
mates in the tax lawmaking process); Charles E. McClure, Jr., The Budget Pro-
cess and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 TAXL. REV. 25, 28-30 (1989) (de-
scribing the interaction between budget policy and tax policy). See also Karla 
W. Simon, The Budget Process and the Tax Law, 40 TAX NOTES 627, 630-34 
(1988) (arguing in favor of including tax expenditures in the budget process). 
52. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, 
Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environ-
mental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 61, 68-79 (describing three models for 
the future of environmental regulation); David L. Markell, The Role of Deter-
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based reforms adopted in the United States have been informed by 
management and budgeting reforms adopted in New Zealand, Brit-
ain, Australia, and other OECD countries during the 1980s and 
1990s,53 with the New Zealand model figuring prominently in the 
United States reform discussions.54 As discussed below, the gov-
ernmental reforms in New Zealand developed from an analytic 
framework informed by a relatively coherent theoretical perspective. 
Implementation of the New Zealand reforms occurred during a 
period of budgetary downsizing and a general ideological shift to-
ward political conservatism (preference for a smaller public sector 
and more reliance on market mechanisms) and was influenced by a 
desire for greater political control over the bureaucracy as well as 
greater accountability of the executive to Parliament.55 The New 
Zealand public management reforms were shaped by a set of eco-
nomic and administrative theories, which were articulated and 
translated into an analytical framework and specific policy propos-
als by the Treasury.56 Particularly influential, according to an 
analysis of the ideas and theories underpinning the New Zealand re-
forms,57 were public choice theory,58 organizational economics (or the 
rence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State I Federal Relationship: The Di-
vide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61-68, 109-14 
(2000) (analyzing ideas for reinventing the state/federal environmental en-
forcement relationship). 
53. See supra note 8 (listing reports on performance management reforms 
adopted by member countries). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development ("OECD") brings together 29 member countries in an organi-
zation in which governments discuss and develop economic and social policy. 
The original 20 members of the OECD, located only in Europe and North 
America, were later joined by Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, and 
then by Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Korea. See OECD 
Online (visited Aug. 4, 2000) <littp://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-
countries.htm>. 
54. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 6, at 328-30. 
55. See BOSTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. The study explains that, his-
torically, New Zealand politics has been dominated by strong prime ministers 
under single-party majority governments: "Ironically, these very institutional 
arrangements facilitated the public sector reforms of the mid to late 1980s, 
which were in some respects a reaction against that style of government." Id. at 
68. 
56. See id. at 16 (citing DEF'T OF TREAsURY, GoVERNMENT MANAGEIIIBNT: 
VOLUMES I AND II (1987) and DEP'T OF TREASURY, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
(1984)). In considering why the theories and management approaches were 
"embraced with such enthusiasm in New Zealand," the authors conclude that 
"part of the answer lies in the gathering together of a group of reform-minded 
policy analysts in the Treasury, their familiarity with the new institutional eco-
nomics and public choice, and their sustained efforts to apply this literature to 
the problems of governance in the public sector." Id. at 28. In addition, they 
note that "these efforts might well have been in vain had it not been for the 
openness of senior ministers to the Treasury's proposals and their willingness 
to implement them, notwithstanding the political risks involved." Id. 
57. The study, by four academics from the fields of public policy, account-
ancy, and industrial relations at Victoria University at Wellington, documents 
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new institutional economics, especially agency theory and transac-
tion cost economics),59 and managerialism (or the new public man-
agement).60 
and analyzes the public sector reforms introduced in New Zealand since the mid 
1980s. See id. at vii-x. 
58. According to the New Zealand study, public choice theory influenced 
the "climate of opinion" within which the model developed-"with its emphasis 
on the budget-maximizing behavior of bureaucrats, its suspicion of politicians' 
motives, and its concern over provider capture." Id. at 17, 27. It also inspired, 
at least in part, the New Zealand model's "drive to separate the provision of 
policy advice from policy implementation," the "emphasis on transparency (e.g. 
in the area of state subsidies and other political interventions), the various at· 
tempts to curb the role of vested interests in governmental policy-making," and 
the "efforts to reduce the scope for political interference in certain policy do· 
mains (e.g. monetary policy)." Id.; see also, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT (1971) (analyzing theories of 
bureaucratic decision-making). 
59. Although the study notes that public choice theory and managerialism 
influenced public sector reforms in many other countries, it observes that this 
has been less true of organizational economics, making the "intellectual origins" 
of the New Zealand reforms "distinctive" in this regard. BOSTON ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 17. According to the study, agency theory (understanding social and 
political life as a series of contracts between principals and agents) "played an 
important role in developing the policy framework that underpinned the corpo-
ratisation and privatisation programmes." Id. at 18, 27. 
[Agency theory] influenced thinking on matters relating to employ-
ment relations, incentive structures, remuneration systems, and per-
formance management, contributing, for instance, to the move to 
fixed-term employment contracts for senior public servants, the em-
phasis on the relationship between ministers and departmental [chief 
executives], and the introduction of [chief executive] performance 
agreements and monitoring arrangements. 
Id. at27. 
The study notes that the influence of transaction-cost economics (closely 
related to agency theory, but focusing primarily on the exchange of physical 
goods rather than on the exchange of services, and dealing \vith the optimal 
governance structures for various types of transactions) is more difficult to 
trace, but connects these ideas with "heightened interest in various forms of 
contracting" and that concepts underpinning transactional cost economics ''have 
been widely used, especially by the Treasury, in formulating policy on issues of 
institutional design." Id. at 21, 27. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Commen-
tary: The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis 
of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1413-16 (1996) (describing the new in-
stitutional economics and summarizing the work of Oliver E. Williamson, 
Douglass North, and others). 
60. The authors of the study describe "managerialism" as "[d]riven primar-
ily by practitioners and private sector consultants rather than academics or 
theoreticians" and that its "slogans include the now familiar 'Let the Managers 
Manage' and 'Managing for Results.'" BOSTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 25. They 
observe the influence of managerialism in the way policy debates have been 
"characterised by a frequent resort to private sector analogies and commercial 
models to explain or critique public sector arrangements." Id. at 27-28. 
In addition, the study describes "a remarkably close fit" between the doc-
trines of managerialism and the policy decisions of the New Zealand model, in-
cluding "the shift from process to output accountability," as well as the empha-
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Although reinvention initiatives in the United States have not 
been forged from a comparably articulated analytical framework, 
the New Zealand model, as well as ideas from other countries and 
from states and localities in this country, have provided a set of pol-
icy ideas for the federal reforms.61 The performance-based manage-
ment reforms, based on managerialism (or new public management), 
developed from a set of ideas more influenced by management con-
sultants and private sector business practices than by economic or 
political theory.62 
In the United States, the performance-based reinvention initia-
tives have been fueled primarily by the desire for greater adminis-
trative control over the bureaucracy, combined with both ideological 
and budget-driven efforts toward government downsizing.63 The 
Clinton administration's major government reinvention initiative, 
the National Partnership for Reinventing Government ("NPR"), 
formerly known as the National Performance Review,64 has focused 
on improving the performance of federal executive agencies while, at 
the same time, holding down costs.65 The NPR recommends in-
creased flexibility for agencies in the use of resources in exchange 
for greater executive oversight and accountability.66 Although the 
NPR has endorsed implementation of the Results Act,67 it has not 
generally addressed the issue of the agencies' dealings with Con-
gress,68 other than advocating relief from ''wasteful" congressional 
sis on consumers, cost-cutting and labor discipline, the preference for private 
ownership and contracting out, the disaggregation of bureaucratic structures, 
and the adoption of private sector management practices. Id. at 28. 
61. For example, the NPR describes the performance agreements ("specific 
commitments, accompanied by measurable performance indicators") that Presi-
dent Clinton is signing with Cabinet secretaries and other agency heads as an-
other "cornerstone," along with the Results Act, of the "new accountability." 
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GoVERNMENT THAT WORKS 
BE'ITER & COSTS LESS 41 (September 1994 Status Report). In implementing 
these reforms, the administration studied similar agreements used in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and also looked to agreements 
and other approaches utilized in Sunnyvale, California and by the state of Ore-
gon. See id. at 43. 
62. See supra note 60. 
63. See supra note 10. 
64. See supra note 7. 
65. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS, supra 
note 7, at2. 
66. See id. at 7 (recommending increased agency budgetary flexibility and 
"empowering employees to get results" by decentralizing decision making power 
and holding federal employees accountable for results). 
67. See id. (specifying that the Results Act "will introduce performance 
measurement throughout the federal government"). 
68. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 413. Mashaw states: 
On the political side, for example, NPR I seems committed to a "Grey-
hound theory" of congressional legislation and oversight. "Just tell us 
the destination and leave the driving to the front line administrators," 
seems to be the message to Congress. Indeed, it is hard to see how 
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restrictions or micromanagement. 69 
The legislative desire for greater control over the bureaucracy 
has been less prominent than the executive's goal of achieving 
greater administrative control through performance-based man-
agement. 70 Nevertheless, that desire, at least in part, underlies the 
Results Act structure for congressional oversight of agency perform-
ance management reforms. In addition, some members of Congress 
may perceive the reforms as leading to new power centers in Con-
gress.71 These oversight reforms and other legislatively imposed 
regulatory reforms, which increase accountability for agency rule-
making, 72 have the potential to clash with the executive's reinven-
tion agenda to improve agency flexibility and efficiency. 
The emphasis on these potentially conflicting aspects of the re-
invention agenda tend to shift, depending on which political party 
controls the executive and the legislative branches of government. 
Id. 
moving authority down the hierarchy could fail to lessen congressional 
control of public policy .... This is unlikely to be supported by a Con-
gress already concerned about its ability to oversee the federal ad-
ministrative establishment. 
For development of the argument for increased regulatory flexibility, see 
Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in 
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Commu-
ni"ty as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
479 (1995) (arguing that agencies should be delegated more control over regula-
tory method and proposing outcome-based performance standards to guide 
agency discretion). But cf. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Admini-
stration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1121, 1212-18 (2000) (arguing that the new entrepreneurial model raises seri-
ous questions of public accountability). 
69. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, THEBLAIRHOUSEPAPERS pt. III,§ 
4 (Jan. 1997) (urging the cabinet to "reinvent to get the job done with less" by 
seeking "Congressional relief from wasteful restrictions"); NATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS, supra note 7, at 32 (elimi-
nating "regulatory overkill" by reducing the burden of congressionally man-
dated reports); see also, e.g., Garvey, supra note 12, at 87-106 (recounting the 
history of reform efforts to construct administrative capacity and to ensure the 
responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the legislative branch, and observing that 
"much of the point of the NPR [National Performance Review] is to undo-or at 
least to moderate-the instruments of bureaucratic control that Americans have 
inherited from the scientific managers and administrative lawyers"). 
70. See Building Lasting Reform, supra note 12, at 69. 
71. See id. at 68-70 (noting that most Members of Congress have "little in-
centive to worry about results" but "everything to gain from publicly embracing 
the broad principles of reinvention and then protecting their constituents and 
favorite programs behind the scenes in committee rooms and little-noticed rid-
ers to complex bills," but that members of the House Government Operations 
Committee and the Senate Government Affairs Committee recognize that these 
issues have "created the potential for new power centers in Congress"). 
72. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 420 (stating that, "[w]hile arguably rein-
forcing the accountability, reasonableness, and procedural fairness of adminis-
trative policy-making, these 'regulatory reform' proposals are designed to stall 
and derail many rule-making efforts"). 
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Although the Results Act was enacted in 1993 by ·a Democratic Con-
gress and embraced by the Clinton administration, one of its most 
vocal supporters was Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R., Del.).73 The 
legislative antecedent of the Results Act was drafted during the 
Bush administration and championed in its original and later forms 
by Senator Roth,74 who had served during the Reagan administra-
tion as chair of the Governmental Affairs Committee. 75 
B. The Results Act Framework: Performance-Based Management 
and Budgeting 
The Results Act creates a new performance-based framework 
for management and oversight of government programs.76 The 
framework, as described below, requires executive agencies to set 
goals for program performance,77 to measure performance results,78 
73. See William V. Roth, Jr., Reinventing Government: Maintaining the 
Momentum, 22 PUB. MANAGER 15 (1993-94). Senator Roth was defeated in his 
bid for reelection in November 2000. See Eric Schmitt, The 2000 Elections: The 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at Bll. He served as chair of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee prior to his defeat. See id. 
74. See Roth, supra note 73, at 15 (describing bipartisan reform efforts and 
referring to Vice President Gore's National Performance Review as "a strong 
and natural manifestation of the momentum which has been building concern-
ing government reform"); Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., Reinventing Politics?: 
The NPR Meets Congress, in INSIDE THE REINVENTION MACIIlNE: APPRAISING 
GoVERNMENTAL REFORM, supra note 7, at 152, 159 (noting that Roth's "frustra-
tion with government's focus on inputs rather than results meshed \vith a new 
Democratic administration's desire for significant administrative reform that 
did not simply gut programs"); see also Walter Groszyk, Implementation of the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, in OECD, PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT IN GoVERNMENT: CONTEMPORARY ILLUSTRATIONS 71, 74 (1996) 
(listing, as immediate antecedents of the Results Act, a Reagan administration 
OMB report, legislation proposed by Senator Roth based on experiences over 
the previous decade in Sunnyvale, California, and the requirements regarding 
program performance measures and information in the Chief Financial Officers 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (codified beginning at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 501)). 
75. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has jurisdiction, among 
other matters, over the organization and reorganization of the executive branch, 
the Federal Civil Service, the census, intergovernmental relations, and is 
charged \vith studying "the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies 
and departments of the Government." SENATE MANuAL CONTAINING THE 
STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAW AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, s. Doc. No. 104-1, at 31-32 (1994). The House 
Committee (which has similar jurisdiction), formerly the Government Opera-
tions Committee, is now called the Committee on Government Reform. 
76. 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1994). 
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 306(a)-(f) (1994) (requiring agency strategic plans for 
program activities); 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(l)-(3) (regarding performance goals in 
agency performance plans), (f)(4). For purposes of the performance plans and 
reports, a "performance goal" is defined as "a target level of performance ex-
pressed as a tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement 
can be compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value, 
or rate." Id. at§ 1115(f)(4). 
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and to report the 'results on an annual basis to the president and 
Congress.79 The framework gives managers greater flexibility by 
allowing the waiver of various administrative controls and limita-
tions in exchange for greater accountability for the performance of 
their programs and operations.80 AB explained below, the Results 
Act also provides for the development and testing of performance-
based budgeting, although that part of the overall reform program 
has made relatively little headway. 81 
In enacting the Results Act, Congress found that "[f]ederal 
managers are seriously disadvantaged" in efforts "to improve pro-
gram efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation 
of program goals and inadequate information on program perform-
ance" and that "congressional policy making, spending decisions and 
program oversight are seriously handicapped by insufficient atten-
tion to program performance and results. "82 The purposes of the Re-
sults Act, among others, are to "improve Federal program effective-
ness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, 
service quality, and customer satisfaction" and to "improve congres-
sional decision making by providing more objective information on 
achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and 
efficiency of Federal programs and spending. »B3 
1. Performance Management 
The Results Act initially created pilot programs to assess the 
costs and benefits of the performance-based management framework 
78. See 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(4)-(6). 
79. See id. § 1116. 
80. See id. § 9703 (providing for OMB review and approval of agency pro-
posals to waive administrative procedural requirements and controls); 31 
U.S.C.A. § 9704 (West 2000) (providing for pilot projects to test the managerial 
accountability and flexibility provisions and requiring a report by OMB by May 
1, 1997); see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 
AND BUDGET, THE GoVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT 
AND BUDGET, l.B.2., I.B.7. (May 1997) [hereinafter 1997 OMB RESULTS ACT 
REPORT] (reporting on the reasons for the lack of designations for flexibility pilot 
projects, including the reforms earlier adopted as part of the National Perform-
ance Review and the efforts underway to create "Performance Based Organiza-
tions," which are given greater personnel and procurement flexibility for a 
commitment to achieve specific improvements in performance ). 
81. See 1997 OMB RESULTS ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at l.C. 
82. Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 2(a), 107 Stat. 285 (including, in addition to the 
two findings mentioned in the text, a finding about waste and inefficiency in 
federal programs). 
83. Id. § 2(b) (articulating six purposes for the Results Act including, in ad-
dition to the two mentioned in the text, improving the confidence of the Ameri-
can people in the federal government, initiating program performance reform 
with a series of pilot projects, helping managers improve service delivery, and 
improving the internal management of the federal government). 
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as well as to test the specifications for performance plans.84 Con-
gress required the 01\IB to report the results of the performance 
management pilot studies to the president and Congress by May 1, 
1997, and since then, the requirements have been more broadly im-
plemented.85 The Results Act now more generally requires federal 
agencies86 to develop multiyear strategic plans,87 annual perform-
ance plans,88 and annual program performance reports.89 The Re-
sults Act also requires the 01\IB to prepare a government-wide per-
formance plan, based on the agencies' performance plans, as part of 
the president's budget presentation to Congress. 90 
Under the Results Act requirements, an agency's performance 
plans and reports are to cover each of their program activities listed 
in the annual budget.91 The performance plans must "establish per-
formance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing the rele-
vant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activ-
84. 31 U.S.C. § 1118(a)-(b) (1994). 
85. See 31 U.S.C. § 1118(c); see also 1997 OMB RESULTS ACT REPORT, supra 
note 80, at Introduction (reporting on agency progress and efforts in meeting 
the requirements of the Results Act). 
86. The Results Act applies to cabinet departments, government corpora-
tions (owned or controlled by the federal government), and nearly all independ-
ent establishments. See 31 U.S.C. § 1115(f) (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 306(f), 
which, in turn, refers to "executive agency" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 105 (2000), 
but not including the Central Intelligence Agency, the General Accounting Of-
fice, the Panama Canal Commission, the United States Postal Service, and the 
Postal Rate Commission). The OMB may also exempt from certain require-
ments any agency with annual outlays of $20 million or less. See 31 U.S.C. § 
1117. 
87. 5 U.S.C.§ 306(b) (1994). The strategic plans must cover at least a five-
year period, and must be updated and revised every three years (except for the 
Department of Defense, which is required to update and revise its plan every 
four years). See 5 U.S.C. at§ 306(b). 
88. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a)(28), 1115(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (beginning 
with a performance plan for fiscal year 1999, which began on October 1, 1998, 
comparing performance with the goals set in the annual performance plan). 
89. Id. § 1116(a) (1994) (beginning with the annual report for fiscal year 
1999, due on March 31, 2000). 
90. Id. § 1105(a)(28) (Supp. IV 1998). In the agency and government-wide 
performance plans, the program performance goals correspond with the pro-
gram funding categories in the budget. 
91. Id. § 1115(a), (f)(6) (1994). The term "program activity" is defined as "a 
specific activity or project as listed in the program and financing schedules of 
the annual budget of the United States Government." Id.§ 1115 (f)(6); see also 
BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at app. (detailing the information provided by 
the "program and financing schedule," which includes "obligations by program 
activity," and explaining that the "activity structure is developed for each ap-
propriation or fund account to provide a meaningful presentation of information 
for the program"). The detailed budget estimates, designed primarily for use by 
the Appropriations Committees, are arranged according to each separate 
branch of government, with the executive branch organized by agency. Tax-
delivered programs are not listed in the Treasury Department's program and 
financing schedules unless they involve direct outlays (for example, refundable 
tax credits). 
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ity."92 An "output measure" is defined as "the tabulation, calcula-
tion, or recording of activity or effort and can be expressed in a 
quantitative or qualitative manner."93 An "outcome measure" is de-
fined as "an assessment of the results of a program activity com-
pared to its intended purpose."94 
Steady progress has been made toward implementing the statu-
tory requirements. Agencies have been developing and submitting 
plans and reports to the OMB, the OMB has undergone a major re-
organization to respond to Results Act requirements,95 and congres-
sional committees review agency Results Act plans and reports as 
part of the oversight process.96 Although the efforts have been un-
even, a government-wide shift toward performance management 
implementation is now unmistakably underway. 
2. Performance Budgeting 
In addition to implementing government-wide performance 
management requirements, the Results Act provides for experimen-
tation with performance budgeting.97 The concept of performance 
92. 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(4). 
93. Id. § 1115(f)(3). 
94. Id. § 1115(f)(2). 
95. See Building Lasting Reform, supra note 12, at 9, 60-64. 
96. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-78, at 3 (1999) (containing the observation 
by the Committee on Government Reform that the use of the Results Act "is af-
firmed in most committee oversight plans" and recommending that "each House 
committee continue using agency strategic plans and performance plans man-
dated by the Results Act as a basis for conducting oversight of agencies and 
programs in its jurisdiction, and for holding government more accountable for 
the activities and services it delivers"); H.R. REP. No. 105-429, at 45 (1998) (de-
scribing the agency strategic plan consultation process with Congress, 'vith 
congressional teams formed around each of the twenty-four largest federal 
agencies and departments, and criticizing and grading the draft strategic 
plans). 
97. The performance budgeting provisions of the Results Act 'vill require 
additional legislation before they can be more broadly implemented. Some of 
the ideas behind performance budgeting developed from progressive era pro-
posals for a national executive budget, first proposed in 1912 by President Taft's 
Commission on Economy and Efficiency. See MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ECONOMY AND 
EFFICIENCY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL BUDGET, H.R. Doc. 
No. 62-854, at 1-12 (2d Sess. 1912). See generally RONALD C. MOE, 
REORGANIZING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY: LANDMARK 
COMMISSIONS 11, 18-21 (CRS Report for Congress No. 92-293, Mar. 19, 1992) 
(describing the rise and fall of progressive movement organizational ideas and 
observing that presidents today tend to "view the design of organizational struc-
tures as simply a chip to be played in the larger game of politics"); JAMES L. 
SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 37-60 (1981) (describ-
ing the shift in managerial authority and fiscal leadership from Congress to the 
president as beginning with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as ex-
panding during the Roosevelt administration, and as receiving more bipartisan 
support after the first report of the Hoover Commission on government reor-
ganization in 1949, which contributed to reorganization of the executive branch 
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budgeting is to link performance information with the budget to 
"improve budget decision making by focusing funding choices on 
program results."98 The Act calls on the 01\IB to designate pilot 
projects in at least five agencies to test preparation of performance 
budgets for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.99 A report to Congress by the 
01\IB on the pilot projects is due by March 31, 2001.100 
Under the Act, the performance-budgets pilot projects "shall 
present, for one or more of the major functions and operations of the 
agency, the varying levels of performance, including outcome-related 
performance, that would result from different budgeted amounts."101 
The Results Act directs the 01\IB to include in its report a descrip-
tion of any difficulties encountered by the pilot agencies in prepar-
ing performance budgets,102 an assessment of the feasibility and ad-
visability of including a performance budget as part of the annual 
budget submitted to Congress, 103 and a recommendation whether 
legislation to require performance budgeting should be proposed.104 
Relatively little progress has been made so far on the perform-
ance-based budgeting aspects of the Results Act, except at a very 
basic level. In 1997, the OMB reported that it had deferred these-
lection of pilot projects.105 The government's General Accounting Of-
into a hierarchy controllable from the top); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW 
POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 53-64 (1988) (describing the early twenti-
eth century executive budget movement). 
During the last forty years, several budget reform initiatives have been 
implemented by executive directive, including the Program, Planning, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) in the 1960s, the Management by Objective (MBO) 
and Zero-Base-Budgeting (ZBB) programs in the 1970s, followed in the 1980s by 
productivity improvement, quality management, and a short-lived revival of 
MBO. See GAO, PERFORMANCE BUDGETING: PAST INITIATIVES OFFER INSIGHTS 
FOR GPRA IMPLEMENTATION, GAO/AIMD-97-46, at 4 (1997) (tracing interest in 
performance budgeting to the first Hoover Commission and its reforms to 
downsize the post WWII government, describing prior budget reforms, and 
comparing and contrasting the earlier reform efforts to the Results Act); 
Groszyk, supra note 74, at 73 (1996) (noting that these initiatives "largely failed 
to take root" beyond the end of a presidential term and distinguishing the Re-
sults Act from earlier efforts). 
98. GAO, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 
U.S. SENATE, PERFORMANCE BUDGETING: INITIAL EXPERIENCES UNDER THE 
RESULTS ACT IN LINKING PLANS WITH BUDGETS, GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67, at 4 
(1999) [hereinafter GAO PERFORMANCE BUDGETING REPORT]. 
99. 31 U.S.C. § 1119(a) (1994). 
100. See id. § 1119(d). 
101. Id. § 1119(b). 
102. Id. § 1119(d)(2). 
103. Id. § 1119(d)(l). 
104. Id. § 1119(d)(3) (1994). In addition, the OMB is directed to set forth 
recommended changes in other Results Act requirements. Id. § 1119(d)(4). 
105. The 1997 OMB Report to Congress explained a planned one-year delay 
in selecting performance budgeting pilot projects as follows: 
Correlating different levels of performance with different funding 
levels can be seen as one form of performance budgeting. Perform-
ance is measured using a single variable. Another form, outlined in 
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fice ("GAO") last year reported to the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs an indefinite delay in the performance budgeting 
pilots called for by the Results Act and recommended that the OMB 
"develop a constructive and practical agenda to further clarify the 
relationship between budgetary resources and results."106 Although 
the GAO found that agency performance plans have begun to dis-
play linkage between budget requests and performance goals, 107 it 
noted that pilot projects were intended to show more specifically 
''how performance would change if the agency received more or less 
than requested."108 The GAO explained the delay in the pilot proj-
ects by reference to the OMB's determination that the performance 
budgeting pilot projects would require agencies to calculate the ef-
fects on performance of marginal changes in cost and funding, a task 
beyond the current capabilities of most agencies. 109 
Although functional presentation of budget information110 is now 
the Senate Committee Report on GPRA envisions the use of 
multi-variate analysis. In doing this analysis, the performance budg-
eting pilots would examine the varying performance levels for each 
measure in a group of measures, and how these levels relate to fund-
ing amounts and changes in these amounts. As certain performance 
levels are emphasized above others, the pilot projects would describe 
the choices and tradeoffs made in the course of defining the preferred 
performance levels for a program. 
This technique often also known as optimization analysis, is 
largely beyond the current capacity of many Federal agencies to do. 
Agencies designated as a performance budgeting pilot project, and 
doing multi-variate analysis, should have adequate cost accounting 
systems. For the programs or operations covered by the pilot projects, 
the agencies should also possess baseline data for both performance 
measures and the cost of achieving different performance levels for 
each measure. This will be needed if agencies are to calculate how 
marginal changes in funding incrementally affect the performance 
levels. 
Significant progress has occurred in recent years in establishing a 
cost accounting capability in the Federal agencies. . . . For the few 
agencies presently having a cost accounting capability, their ability to 
develop marginal cost information is very limited. OMB's assessment 
of the current extent of cost accounting capability among the agencies 
was an important factor in deciding to defer the start of the perform-
ance budgeting pilot projects. 
1997 OMB RESULTS ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at l.C (reporting on the per-
formance budgeting pilot projects required by the Results Act). 
106. GAO PERFORMANCE BUDGETING REPORT, supra note 98, at 3, 5-8, 37 
(recommending that the O:MB assess the linkages between performance goals 
and program activities presented in the fiscal year 2000 plans and then develop 
its agenda to clarify the relationship between resources and results, "beginning 
\vith specific guidance for the preparation of agencies' fiscal year 2001 plans"). 
107. Id. at 12-28. 
108. Id. at 7. 
109. Id. at 7, 31-34. 
110. For discussion of functional budgeting, in which budget resources are 
grouped and allocated according to the purposes or objectives they serve, see 
infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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included as part of the government-wide performance plan in the 
president's budget submission,m it is unclear whether the Results 
Act will ever lead to development of performance-based budgetary 
analysis. As experience with reform in other countries has shown, 
performance-based budgeting is more likely to be achieved in a set-
ting with full cost activity accounting,112 with output-based budget-
ing (rather than input-based line item budgeting), and in which the 
programs being evaluated consist of a set of tangible and measur-
able products or services with visible effects soon after the services 
or products are provided.113 Therefore, it remains to be seen whether 
the Results Act will prompt next-stage developments, which might 
eventually lead to a broader structural reform of the budget process. 
Accordingly, the following discussion focuses primarily on the per-
formance-based management aspects of the Results Act. 
II. INCORPORATION OF TAX EXPENDITURES INTO THE RESULTS ACT 
FRAMEWORK 
As described above, the Results Act, now in its formative stages, 
offers an opportunity for more integrated analysis of programs 
through a combination of executive and legislative performance re-
view of federal agencies and programs. The Results Act requires 
agencies to develop multi-year strategic plans for their program ac-
tivities, to establish measurable performance goals, and to develop 
annual plans to help them meet their performance goals. They then 
must report their progress annually to the president and to Con-
gress. 
111. See, e.g., BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, 166-69 & tbl.10-1 (including 
budget function estimates for spending, credit activity, and tax expenditures), 
171-287 (discussing programs by budget function and incorporating tax expen-
ditures into presentation); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2000, at 39, 41, ch. VI tbl.12-1 (1999) [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 2000] (de-
scribing the increased emphasis on functional analysis in presentation of the 
budget as part of the "reinventing government" efforts under the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993). 
112. See Groszyk, supra note 74, at 77 (explaining that cost accounting data 
will be required for "optimization analyses," which presents "choices and trade-
offs between different levels of performance for the same or different budget 
levels"). 
113. See generally, e.g., BOSTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 260-314 (describing 
New Zealand's financial management and budget reforms, which shifted a tra-
ditional focus on annual cash costs of inputs (staff, maintenance, materials, 
travel, etc.) to an emphasis on output budgeting and accrual accounting); 
OECD, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT SERVICE, INTEGRATING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, PUMA/SB0-(99)4/FINAL, at 9, 13-15 (1999), 
available at <http://\V\V\V.olis.oecd.org/olis/1999doc.nsf/63c71d2d4054d0fdc125 
685d0053aee4/4alf6b123769a96fc12567b70042a366/$FILE/07E97729.ENG> 
(e~'J>laining that performance management and budgeting have tended to oper-
ate in separate spheres in member countries and discussing the technical and 
political reasons why integration is difficult and often does not take place). 
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The following discussion describes the efforts made so far to in-
corporate tax expenditures into the Results Act framework, puts 
these steps toward reform into context by describing past efforts at 
tax expenditure reform, and then explains why budget process re-
forms have made tax expenditure reform more difficult. 
A. Tax Expenditures and the Results Act 
In its report on the bill that became the Results Act, the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs emphasized the need for in-
creased oversight and analysis of tax expenditures and called on the 
OMB to develop a framework for periodic analysis of the effect of tax 
expenditures on the achievement of the goals and objectives in stra-
tegic and annual plans.114 In outlining its expectations,116 the Com-
mittee specified that the government-wide "performance plans 
should include a schedule for periodically assessing the effects of 
specific tax expenditures in achieving performance goals" and that 
the "annual performance reports would subsequently be used to re-
port on these tax expenditure assessments. "116 The assessments 
"should consider the relationship and interactions between spending 
programs and related tax expenditures."117 Finally, the Committee 
expressed the hope "that such reports will foster a greater sense of 
responsibility for tax expenditures with a direct bearing on substan-
tial missions and goals."118 
The GAO made some more detailed suggestions to the OMB and 
to the Treasury regarding Results Act-related reforms in a study of 
tax expenditures published in 1994.119 In its report, the GAO re-
114. See S. REP. 103-58, at 27-28 (1993). In addition to calling on the OMB 
to establish an appropriate analytical framework, and to describe the frame-
work in OMB's 1997 report to Congress and the president, the Committee called 
for a periodic assessment of the effects of specific tax expenditures in meeting 
performance goals. See id. at 28. 
115. See id. at 28. The Report stated as follows: 
Id. 
To increase significantly the oversight and analysis of tax expendi-
tures, the Committee believes that the annual overall Federal Gov-
ernment performance plans should include a schedule for periodically 
assessing the effects of specific tax expenditures in achieving perform-
ance goals. (This schedule would be in addition to the primary con-
tent of the overall plan-the program performance goals tied to the di-
rect expenditure of funds.) The Committee expects that annual 
performance reports would subsequently be used to report on these 
tax expenditure assessments. These assessments should consider the 
relationship and interactions between spending programs and related 
tax expenditures. The Committee hopes that such reports will foster a 
greater sense of responsibility for tax expenditures with a direct 
bearing on substantial missions and goals. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. GAO, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES DESERVE MORE SCRUTINY, 
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viewed the advantages and disadvantages of various general options 
that could be used to control the growth of tax expenditures.120 The 
GAO report discussed three main options: (1) strengthening or ex-
tending current techniques for controlling tax expenditures with lit-
tle or no change in congressional processes and jurisdictions;121 (2) 
increased integration of tax expenditures into the budget process;122 
or (3) more integrated reviews of tax expenditures with functionally 
related outlay programs.123 
The report's first and third options have the greatest applica-
bility to the Results Act performance management reforms. With 
regard to the first option, incorporating tax expenditures into the 
GAO/GGD/AIMD-94-122 (1994) [hereinafter GAO TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY]. 
120. Id. at 95 (summarizing the agency's conclusions). 
121. These techniques include controls on individual tax expenditures by 
imposing ceilings or floors on eligibility, requiring the reporting of information 
on tax e"--penditures, or imposing periodic review on them through sunset provi-
sions. Ceilings on eligibility include caps on the amount of activity that quali-
fies for the ta." benefit or on the amount of benefit a taxpayer can receive in a 
given year. Floors require a taxpayer to spend a certain amount on an activity 
before qualifying for the benefit. See GAO TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY, supra note 
119, at 3, 39-56. For examples of such provisions, see infra Parts III.B and III.C 
(describing the employment tax credits). 
122. One such approach discussed in the GAO study would be for Congress 
to decide whether cuts in existing tax expenditures are desirable and, if so, to 
set specific targets for reduction in foregone revenue in annual budget resolu-
tions. The cuts would then be enforced through the existing budget reconcilia-
tion process. Although these steps could be accomplished \vithin the framework 
of current budget procedures, this approach would expand the role of the budget 
committees in ta." policymaking. See generally GAO TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY, 
supra note 119, at 3-4, 57-70. 
123. See generally GAO TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY, supra note 119, at 4, 71-
93. In its discussion of the third option, the GAO described an integrated re-
view system, temporarily used by Canada, as follows: 
In the 1980s, Canada tried and subsequently discontinued a for-
mal system of integrating proposed tax expenditures into its policy-
making process. This system involved the allocation of overall expen-
ditures into nine "envelopes," with increased flexibility for program 
departments to make trade-offs from one spending program to an-
other within each "envelope." The envelope system subtracted the 
revenue cost of any new or expanded tax expenditure from the tar-
geted amount available for spending within the program envelope. 
According to Treasury officials, the envelope system may have failed 
in part because the finance minister had the flexibility to propose new 
ta." e"--penditures, thus undermining the discipline intended by the 
process. However, any revenue savings from proposals to reduce ex-
isting ta." e"--penditures in an "envelope" were not automatically allo-
cated to that envelope. Therefore, this system did not provide an in-
centive to make trade-offs between existing tax expenditures and 
other spending programs within a given functional area. 
If Congress or the executive branch adopts an integrated system 
for reviewing outlay programs and tax expenditures, incentives for 
making such trade-offs may be necessary. 
Id. at73. 
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Results Act framework, without more, would require the executive 
branch to make more information available about tax expenditures, 
but it would not necessarily require changes in congressional proce-
dures.124 With regard to the third option, the GAO report observed 
that more integrated reviews of functionally related programs could 
"make the government's overall funding effort more efficient" and 
"could be done by the executive or legislative branches, or both."125 
The GAO report noted that "[b]ecause fewer jurisdictional hur-
dles would arise, the executive branch annual budget preparation 
process may offer a more expeditious opportunity" than integrated 
Committee procedures126 to implement reviews of spending programs 
and related tax expenditures.127 The GAO report observed that the 
Results Act, when implemented, could provide "a link between 
budget reviews and an assessment of how well tax expenditures and 
outlay programs meet agency performance goals,"128 and that the 
"OMB, in consultation with Treasury, could develop a process to an-
nually review selected tax expenditures in conjunction with the 
budget review process for related spending programs."129 The roles 
of the OMB, the Treasury, and the agencies with direct expenditure 
programs "would need to be established to most effectively assess 
tax expenditures' performance, as well as their interaction with re-
lated spending programs."130 
In its 1997 Results Act report to Congress, the OMB set forth an 
124. Id. at 52-53. 
125. GAO TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY, supra note 119, at 4. Increased coordi-
nation could reduce overlap and inconsistencies among programs. As noted in 
the GAO study, current budget and tax policy processes "provide no systematic 
way of avoiding duplication and overlap among discretionary spending pro-
grams and tax expenditures that serve similar purposes." Id. at 71. 
126. Id. at 7. 
127. The GAO recommended that joint review of spending programs and 
related tax expenditures be implemented by holding joint hearings or, more 
formally, by adopting sequential jurisdiction for tax expenditure subsidy pro-
grams or by establishing joint committees in functional areas. See id. at 6-7, 
73-76. 
128. Id. at 92. 
129. Id. at 97. The Treasury's comments on the GAO study agreed "that a 
more comprehensive periodic review of tax expenditures would be useful" (Op-
tion 1). Id. at 132. The Treasury was not convinced that either Option 2 or 3 
would provide the benefits anticipated in the report, however. The Treasury 
pointed out that tax expenditures are already subject to budget discipline under 
the "pay-go" rules. See id. at 132. The Treasury cautioned that measurement 
and conceptual problems underlying tax expenditure estimates would be quite 
serious if tax expenditures were explicitly integrated into the budget process 
(Option 2). With regard to Option 3, the Treasury pointed out that the Cana-
dian experience with incorporating tax expenditures into their budget process 
(by assigning responsibility for the cost of new tax expenditures to the program 
minister proposing the expenditure) had not been very encouraging. Although 
it led "to a significant reduction in demands for new tax expenditures by the 
program ministers," it did not last long. Id. at 134. 
130. Id. at 92. 
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initial framework for tax expenditure review, emphasizing that de-
veloping a "comprehensive, accurate, and flexible" framework "to re-
flect the objectives and effects of the wide range of tax expenditures 
will be a significant challenge."131 The framework gave the Treasury 
"lead responsibility for pilot evaluations of several selected tax-
expenditure provisions ... [t]o explore methods for tax expenditure 
evaluation" and "to gather experience on a cross-section of issues."132 
The Treasury's initial pilot study selected three tax expendi-
tures-one from each of the separate areas of individual, business, 
and international taxation133-to study the evaluation methods and 
resource needs connected with evaluating the relationship between 
tax expenditures and performance goals. The Treasury found that 
much of the data needed for analysis is not currently available.134 
Assessment of data needs and availability from governmental and 
non-governmental sources, it concluded, should prove useful to com-
pare the effectiveness of tax expenditures with "outlay, regulatory 
and other tax policies as means of achieving objectives."135 The 
Treasury plans to undertake additional studies in the next few 
years.1as 
The above described movement toward performance review 
within the government, with corresponding increased congressional 
oversight over executive agencies, may eventually provide the in-
formation needed for analysis of functionally related government 
programs. However, much remains unclear about how performance 
information will be used once it is developed. Additionally, it re-
131. 1997 OMB RESULTS ACT REPORT, supra note 80, at IV. 
132. Id. 
133. The tax expenditures studied in the pilot program were the tax exemp-
tion for worker's compensation benefits, the tax credit for non-conventional fu-
els, and the tax exclusion for certain amounts of income earned by Americans 
living abroad. See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2000, supra note 
111, at ch. 5, 121. 
134. See id. 
135. Id. 
136. The Treasury plans studies over the next several years focusing on the 
availability of data needed to assess the effects of "selected significant tax ex-
penditures, primarily those designed to increase savings." Id. In addition, the 
Treasury will develop "summarized data on the beneficiaries and other eco-
nomic properties of such provisions," where feasible, to complement information 
published by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Senate Budget Commit-
tee. Id. As part of this effort, the Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis and the IRS 
Statistics of Income Division are "developing the specifications for a new data 
sample which will follow the same individual income tax filers over an extended 
period of time." .ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, 
at ch. 5, 124. This "panel" sample will attempt to capture the effect of changes 
in tax law over an extended period of time, permitting "more extensive, and bet-
ter, analyses of many tax provisions than can be performed using only cross-
section data" of the effects of tax law at a single point in time. In particular, 
Treasury intends that data from the panel sample will "enhance our ability to 
analyze the effect of tax expenditures designed to increase savings." Id. 
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mains to be seen whether the executive agencies and Congress will 
continue, over the long-term, the level of management and oversight 
commitment necessary to make functional performance-based 
analysis a reality. 
B. Some History: Past Attempts at Tax Expenditure Reform 
If successful, the Results Act reform efforts described above 
could broaden the role of tax expenditure analysis from its current 
use as a budgetary information tool into a program assessment and 
oversight tool. Such a shift in function has previously eluded re-
formers, however, largely due to the difficulty of achieving meaning-
ful programmatic and legislative review of tax expenditures. This 
section summarizes the major budget and tax reform claims of tax 
expenditure theory, focusing on its program for legislative reform. 
After a brief historical overview of the influence of tax expenditure 
analysis on the tax legislative process, the remaining subsections 
explain specific legislative reform proposals and describe some of the 
institutional and political obstacles that have blocked their full im-
plementation. 
1. Past Tax Expenditure Reforms: Impact on the Legislative 
Process 
Under tax expenditure analysis, tax expenditures require 
evaluation as subsidies or spending provisions, rather than as in-
come measurement or revenue raising provisions in the tax code.137 
Once a provision is identified as a "tax expenditure,"138 tax expendi-
137. See Victor Thuronyi, Ta.x Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 1155, 1156 (discussing how tax expenditures function as government sub-
sidies). 
138. Legal scholars have extensively debated issues related to defining and 
measuring a "tax expenditure." Much of the controversy about tax expenditure 
analysis has focused on the difficulty of distinguishing "tax preferences" from 
"normal" or structural tax provisions deemed necessary to define the income tax 
base. There is no precise definition of the income tax baseline or the exceptions 
to it. 
For an early discussion of these problems, see Boris I. Bittker, Accounting 
for Federal "Ta,x Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969) 
[hereinafter Accounting for Federal "Ta,x Subsidies'1; Boris I. Bittker, The Ta,x 
Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 
538 (1969); and Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Ta.x Expenditure 
Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969). See also Mi-
chael J. Mcintyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Ta,x Expenditure, 14 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 82-83 (1980) (proposing a methodology for identifying tax 
expenditures that bypasses problems of defining the normal tax structure); 
Thuronyi, supra note 137, at 1163-70 (summarizing the academic criticism of 
the tax expenditure concept and suggesting a reformulation that does not rely 
on a normative income tax); see also, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deduc-
tions in an Ideal Income Ta.x, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 313 (1972) (examining 
whether certain personal deductions can be seen as refinement of ideal income); 
Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Ta.x Base" as a Goal of Income Ta.x Reform, 
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ture theorists urge policymakers to consider whether financial assis-
tance is warranted and, if so, to determine whether a direct govern-
ment grant or a tax expenditure would provide a better framework 
in which to provide government assistance.139 Fewer tax expendi-
tures in the tax code, they explain, would lead to a more equitable, 
more efficient, and more administrable tax system and, thus, to bet-
ter tax policy.140 The tax reform project of tax expenditure theorists, 
therefore, combines the related goals of achieving a more compre-
hensive income-measuring tax base with the elimination, whenever 
feasible, of ta.-.:: expenditures from the tax code. 141 
Although some reforms suggested by tax expenditure theorists 
have been adopted by Congress, including the identification and 
listing of tax expenditures as part of the budget process since 
197 4,142 as well as movement toward a more comprehensive tax base 
with the adoption of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 143 much of the ta..x 
eA"Penditure reform agenda remains unaccomplished. As explained 
80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 934 (1967) (criticizing the internal inconsistencies and 
individual judgments, made by Surrey's income tax baseline); Thomas D. 
Griffith, Theories of Personal Deduction in the Income Tax, 40 HAsTINGS L.J. 
343, 344-45 (1989) (evaluating the different models of personal deductions ap-
plied by Surrey, Andrews, and Kelman); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions 
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit 
Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 835 (1979) (criticizing 
Andrews' analysis and proposing an alternative net income tax base). 
139. See TA.-..:: EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 99-117; Stanley S. Surrey, Tax 
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with 
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 713-34 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Tax Incentives as a Device]. 
140. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 25-27. 
141. Comprehensive ta..x base proposals and the tax expenditure concept do 
not completely overlap, having some different antecedents and proponents, but 
they are related to the extent that they both seek to broaden the income tax 
base. Cf. Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, supra 
note 138, at 251 (distinguishing between comprehensive tax base and tax ex-
penditure concepts). 
142. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). Although both the Treasury and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation list tax expenditures under the functional headings used in the 
budget, the listings are informational in nature. Budget decisions are not based 
on these listings. 
143. Ta..x Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as 
amended beginning at 26 u.s.c. § 1); see also 1 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEF'T 
OF THE TREASURY, TA.'\: REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOI\llC 
GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT vii (1984) (dis-
cussing proposal to reform the income tax system) [hereinafter TREASURY I]. 
See generally TIIIIOTHY J. CONLAN ET AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TA.X 
REFORM 45-80, 242-44 (1990) (describing the role played by tax policy experts in 
developing the concept of comprehensive tax reform). But cf. Thuronyi, supra 
note 137, at 1179-81 (arguing that tax expenditure analysis requires treating 
tax expenditures as spending programs, and that the tax reform proposals 
leading to the 1986 Act failed to perform this analysis). 
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in greater detail below, 144 other budget reforms and structures have 
interceded in the meantime, such as discretionary spending caps 
and the pay-as-you go ("paygo") system, 145 which have institutional-
ized certain budgetary separations between tax expenditures and 
direct expenditures.146 Relatively few tax expenditures identified in 
the budget since 197 4 have been eliminated from the tax code. 147 
In recent years, tax expenditures have proliferated. The 
Clinton administration proposed the adoption of new and expanded 
tax incentives and credits148 as a means of accomplishing many as-
pects of its domestic social policy agenda. In dollar amounts, reve-
nue losses from tax expenditures have increased, 149 reflecting a phe-
144. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
145. See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388-573 (codified as amended beginning at 2 U.S.C. § 900); see also discussion 
infra Part II.C. 
146. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in 
the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 397-405 (1998) (describ-
ing the two-part division of the budget into discretionary programs, containing 
subdivisions corresponding to the jurisdiction of the thirteen appropriations 
subcommittees, and tax and entitlement legislation, falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the tax-writing committees). The two-part division of the budget means 
that there is no process for making trade-offs between discretionary spending 
programs and tax expenditures or to force evaluation of which type of program 
would be the most effective for a given purpose. 
147. The Tax Reform Act ("TRA") of 1986 may have represented a high-
water mark for such reform efforts. See John F. Witte, The Tax Reform Act of 
1986: A New Era in Tax Politics?, 19 AM. POL. Q. 438, 443 (1991) (stating that 
"[s]eventy-two provisions tightened tax expenditures, including 14 that involved 
complete repeal, a figure approximately equal to the total number of ta.'l: expen-
ditures that had been repealed from 1913 through 1985"); see also JOHN F. 
WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 271-72 
(1985) (acknowledging the controversy surrounding any attempt to measure the 
costs and effects of tax expenditures and explaining the methodology of his tax 
expenditure study). But cf. Thuronyi, supra note 137, at 1176-77 (finding only 
one instance in which the 1986 Act substituted a direct expenditure for a re· 
pealed provision, i.e., the amendment of the Social Security Act to provide fed· 
eral spending support for expenses of adopting children with special needs in 
place of an itemized tax deduction for such expenses). 
148. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A (Supp. IV 1998) (Hope and Lifetime Learning 
credits), § 51 (Supp. IV 1998) (work opportunity credit), § 51A (Supp. IV 1998) 
(welfare-to-work credit), § 1396 (West Supp. 2000) (empowerment zone em· 
ployment credit), § 1397A (West Supp. 2000) (increase in§ 179 expensing for 
enterprise zone businesses), § 1397E (West Supp. 2000) (credit to holders of 
qualified zone academy bonds); see also I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 2000) (expanded 
earned income tax credit). For some recently proposed tax initiatives, see THE 
BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at 3-9 
(describing administration proposals to expand the earned income tax credit, 
extend and expand empowerment zone tax credits, create "new markets" tax 
incentives to attract private investment to distressed rural and urban areas, 
provide a long-term care tax credit, a tax credit for Medicare buy-in premiums, 
etc.). 
149. See GAO TAX EXPENDITURE STUDY, supra note 119, at 17 & fig. 1.1, 35· 
37 (finding an upward trend in the total number of tax expenditures and in JCT 
2000] REINVENTING TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 785 
nomenon that some commentators have analogized to the growth in 
entitlements in the direct expenditure budget.150 Over the last dec-
ade, there has been a movement away from the reforms proposed by 
ta."'{ expenditure theorists.151 The trend is now toward substitution of 
discretionary spending with tax expenditures.152 
2. The Legislative Reform Proposals 
The legislative reform proposals153 of tax expenditure theorists 
estimates of aggregate tax expenditure revenue losses from 1974 to 1986, a 
downward trend in revenue losses after implementation of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, followed by another trend upward in the 1990s approaching the high 
point ofrevenue losses in the 1980s). 
150. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 33, at 34-37 & tbl.1.4, 183. See generally, 
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device, supra note 139, at 726 (noting the similarity 
of tax e:iq>enditures to "uncontrollable direct expenditures in the budget"). 
151. As noted in the introduction, outlay equivalents of total tax expendi-
tures now exceed amounts for all discretionary spending in the federal budget. 
See Gutman, supra note 32, at 94 (citing budget figures for fiscal year 1999, and 
noting an aggregate revenue loss from tax expenditures equal to 130% of the 
direct spending budget and an outlay equivalent for tax expenditures of ap-
proximately 140% of direct spending); Sugin, supra note 32, at 408 (noting that 
the federal government spent more money through the Code in 1998 than 
through the discretionary appropriations process and that the "tax law's tradi-
tional revenue-raising function is being eclipsed as it becomes a principal tool of 
federal policy"). 
152. See Leonard E. Burman, Surplus Tax Policy?, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 405, 409 
(1999) (e:iq>laining that "budget rules create a strong incentive to channel new 
spending through the ta...x side of the budget"); see also Sheryl Stratton, The 
1990s: The Tax Expenditure Decade?, 2000 TNT 66-4, April 4, 2000 (explaining 
that tax expenditures have increasingly been used as a substitute for direct 
spending, particularly in promoting social goals). See generally HOWARD, supra 
note 33, at 190 (observing that, since the links between tax expenditures and 
direct e:i..-penditures were recognized by policymakers in the 1970s, the "most 
common response" by moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats "has 
been to use ta...x expenditures as a means of slowing the growth or preventing 
the creation of traditional social programs"). 
153. In comparison to the attention paid to the normative tax base issues 
raised by the definition of tax expenditures, relatively few tax scholars have fo-
cused on tax expenditure legislative reform proposals. See, e.g., Harnessing 
Politics, supra note 51, at 569 (arguing that "a better strategy for proponents of 
rigorous and meaningful tax expenditure analysis" is to modify current pay-as-
you go budget procedures "rather than continuing to advocate the adoption of 
other mechanisms that might spark congressional deliberation of these issues"); 
Thuronyi, supra note 137, at 1170-81 (proposing an alternative tax expenditure 
definition as a means of facilitating institutional reforms); cf. Edward A. Zelin-
sky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TE.'C. 
L. REV. 973, 975 (1986) [hereinafter Efficiency and Income Taxes] (defending 
certain tax e:i..-penditures under the efficiency norm of tax policy); Edward A. Ze-
linsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense 
of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (cri-
tiquing the asserted expertise of direct expenditure institutions and defending 
ta..x institutions as less susceptible to interest group capture). For a sampling of 
contributions by scholars to the definitional issues, see supra note 138; infra 
notes 165-70 and accompanying text. 
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were proposed within a broad framework of corrective reform meas-
ures, which included both direct and indirect approaches.154 Under 
the preferred direct corrective approach, policymakers would survey 
the list of tax expenditures, determining which items on the list 
could be dropped without any substitute financial assistance, which 
should be replaced with direct assistance programs, and which 
should be retained because the tax system provides the best delivery 
vehicle for providing the desired financial assistance.155 A leading 
proponent of tax expenditure analysis, Stanley S. Surrey, 156 sug-
gested that "de-escalation" of the use of tax preferences be accom-
plished as a practical matter by identifying existing tax expendi-
tures, allowing some time for development of alternative direct 
expenditure programs where appropriate, imposing time limits on 
tax expenditures, and, upon termination of the expenditures, fund-
ing the direct expenditure programs with dollars returned to the 
revenue side of the budget.157 Any new tax incentive adopted by 
Congress, he argued, should similarly be enacted with an automatic 
termination date to encourage the eventual shift to a direct expendi-
ture program or, at a minimum, to prompt an evaluation of the tax 
expenditure's effectiveness.158 
Acknowledging that "direct approaches [sometimes] incur head-
on opposition,"159 Surrey also proposed indirect approaches to mod-
erate the abuses and inequities caused by tax expenditures.160 Indi-
rect corrective measures include imposing restraints on the opera-
tion of tax expenditures, such as limitations on the creation of tax 
shelters, 161 and on the taxpayer's overall use of tax expenditures, 
such as personal deduction allocation requirements, interest deduc-
154. See PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 23, at 247. 
155. See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Ap· 
proaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental As· 
sistance, 84 HARV. L. REv. 352, 361-62 (1970). 
156. Stanley S. Surrey, a Harvard Law School professor, served as Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961 to 1969. See Erwin N. Griswold, 
A True Public Servant, 98 HARV. L. REV. 329 (1984). Under Surrey's leadership, 
the Treasury published its first tax expenditure analysis in 1968. See U.S. 
DEp'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNuAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON 
THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1968, Doc. 
No. 3245, at 35-36, at 322 ex.29 (1969). 
157. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives-Conceptual Criteria for Identifica-
tion and Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, in TAX INCENTIVES, 
SYMPOSIUM CONDUCTED BY THE TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, NOVEMBER 20-21, 
1969, 3, at 36 (1971) [hereinafter Tax Incentives-Conceptual Criteria]. 
158. See id.; Tax Incentives as a Device, supra note 139, at 737-38. 
159. PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 23, at 247. 
160. See id.; see also Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-
How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1957). 
161. See PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 23, at 248-53 (suggesting 
ways to reduce the scope of tax shelters and to limit the tax shelter "ingredi-
ents" of deferral, leverage, and capital gain treatment). 
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tion limitations, and an alternative minimum tax.162 Surrey viewed 
these measures as problematic because of the additional complexity 
introduced into the tax system to offset the effects of tax expendi-
tures. He argued that the more direct approach to legislative reform 
would result in a simpler, more administrable income tax system as 
well as a more rational budget policy.163 
Congress requires the listing of tax expenditures as part of the 
budget process, as mentioned above,164 despite the theoretical165 and 
political difficulties166 with defining tax expenditures. During the 
Reagan administration, the Treasury Department developed a defi-
nition167 different from the standard used by the Joint Committee on 
162. See id. at 254-82. 
163. A number of provisions, conceptually similar to indirect corrective 
measures catalogued by Surrey, were later adopted or expanded as part of the 
tax base broadening efforts culminating in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. Law. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); see e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 469 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (passive loss limitations); § 163(h) (Supp. IV 1998) 
(personal interest limitations); § 163(d) (1994) (investment interest limited to 
net investment income); § 57(a)(6)(A) (repealed 1993) (certain appreciation in 
property donated to charity treated as preference for alternative minimum tax 
purposes). See generally Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A 
Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, 67 TE.'{. L. REV. 499, 502 (1989) (criticizing the approach of restricting tax 
shelters without eliminating preferences). 
164. See supra note 27; see also 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1994) (defining tax expen-
ditures as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or 
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax li-
ability"). 
165. Tax scholars have challenged Surrey's underlying assumptions, ques-
tioning, as a threshold matter, whether a list of tax expenditures could be iden-
tified based on other than arbitrary criteria and, if so, how the criteria should 
be determined. See supra note 138. 
166. Business representatives immediately rejected the asserted equivalence 
between tax preferences and direct government outlays. See Carl H. Madden & 
James R. Morris, Tax Incentives: Employment and Training of the Disadvan-
taged, in TA..'{ INCENTIVES, SYMPOSIUM: CONDUCTED BY THE TAX INSTITUTE OF 
AMERICA, NOVEI\IBER 20-21, 1969, at 231, 234-35 (including argument by eco-
nomic analysts employed by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
that tax expenditure analysis rests "on the presumption that government has a 
preeminent claim on income and resources" and that tax incentives instead 
properly acknowledge the productive owner's "prior, even natural, ownership 
claim to that income"). Some members of Congress have similarly been skepti-
cal of treating tax e::...'llenditures as equivalent to direct outlays rather than as 
equivalent to tax cuts. Elimination of tax expenditures is perceived by them to 
be a tax increase and, thus, difficult politically unless combined \vith a highly 
visible rate reduction or some other popular offset. 
167. Under the reference tax baseline approach adopted by the Treasury, a 
provision is treated as a tax expenditure only if it is an exception from some 
general rule stated in the law. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB, 
THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1983, SPECIAL 
ANALYSIS G, 1, 5 (1982) (stating that "[f]or a provision to involve a tax subsidy, 
two conditions are necessary: -The provision must be 'special' in that it applies 
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Taxation.168 Scholars have suggested other ways of addressing the 
definitional issues, ranging from narrowly confining the list to those 
universally recognized as spending programs, to broadly including 
all arguable tax expenditures, to a more middle ground position of 
redefining tax expenditures as "substitutable" tax provisions-that 
is, to those provisions that could be easily substituted by direct ex-
penditure programs because they do not serve significant tax-
related functions.169 Despite the difficulty of arriving at a consensus 
about which tax code provisions should be included on any list of 
"tax expenditures," the following discussion assumes that a work-
able definition could be devised to identify "subsidy'' programs pro-
vided through the income tax system.170 
What, then, does tax expenditure theory offer as a more detailed 
blueprint for legislative reform? Specific budget reform proposals 
are discussed below, including functional budgeting and other more 
modest reforms, followed by a summary of tax system reforms re-
lated to the evaluation of tax expenditures as spending programs. 
As discussed in greater detail below, many of the obstacles to reform 
were anticipated by Surrey and others early on. Some have become 
to a narrow class of transactions or taxpayers; and - There must be a 'general' 
provision to which the 'special' provision is a clear exception"). For example, the 
Treasury omits accelerated depreciation from the tax expenditure list because 
accelerated depreciation has been the general rule since 1981, not the excep-
tion. See id. at 6-7; see also Sugin, supra note 32, at 424-27 (arguing that the 
reference tax law baseline politicized the tax expenditure budget); cf. Thuronyi, 
supra note 137, at 1182-86 (discussing the development by the Treasury of the 
reference tax baseline to avoid many of the judgments made under the norma-
tive approach). 
168. Under the Joint Committee's approach, tax expenditures are defined by 
reference to a modified normative tax base. The normative model is based on 
the Haig-Simons economic definition of income as the sum of the taxpayers con-
sumption and savings during the taxable period, modified in several important 
respects. Due to practical administrative concerns, it excludes unrealized gains 
and losses, imputed income, and inflation adjustments. In addition, it assumes 
the present classical system of taxing most corporations on their income sepa-
rately from the taxation of shareholders. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000-
2004 (JCS-13-99), December 22, 1999, reprinted in 86 TAX NOTES 103, 107-09 
(2000) (explaining the differences between the Joint Committee staff and 
Treasury lists of tax expenditures). 
169. See Mcintyre, supra note 138, at 88-89; see also Thuronyi, supra note 
137, at 1163-71, 1181-2, 1186-87 (summarizing the definitional issues and ar-
guing that substitutable tax provisions can be classified by identifying the sig-
nificant purposes of the provision and then by determining whether a nontax 
program could serve those purposes equally well). 
170. These definitional questions have recently received attention again as 
scholars show renewed interest in exploring the constitutional law ramifica-
tions of tax expenditure analysis. See, e.g., Donna D. Adler, The Internal Reve-
nue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analy-
sis in Judicial Decision-Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855 (1993); Sugin, 
supra note 32; Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equiva-
lent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998). 
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more difficult to overcome as budgetary reforms and spending limi-
tations have been implemented over the intervening years. 
a. Budget reforms. Leading tax expenditure theorists argue 
that both direct expenditures and tax expenditures should be taken 
into account in setting spending priorities, controlling overall fed-
eral spending, and evaluating and controlling spending for particu-
lar programs within the budget.171 Tax expenditure theorists and 
others have proposed various ways of reforming the budget process 
to accomplish greater integration and control of both tax expendi-
tures and direct spending.172 
One proposed approach would include tax expenditures in an 
integrated functional analysis of the budget, in which budget re-
sources would be classified and evaluated according to the purposes 
they serve.173 Although the budget currently contains some func-
tional presentation of programs,174 functional analysis is not an im-
portant part of the budget process.175 Functional budgeting would 
171. See TA.'{ EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 32-33. 
172. In terms of controlling overall federal spending, suggestions have in-
cluded making ta.x expenditures subject to across-the-board spending cuts, the 
line item veto, multiyear budgeting and appropriations, entitlement caps, and, 
more generally, imposing a constitutionally based balanced budget requirement 
on Congress. See generally, e.g., ALLEN SCIDCK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, 
POLICY, PROCESS 196-203 (1995) (outlining and critiquing various proposed 
spending controls); SHAVIRO, supra note 49, at 221-304 (1997) (analyzing pro-
posed ways of limiting both spending and tax levels); WILDAVSKY, supra note 97, 
at 396-439 (critiquing various approaches and arguing that substituting budget 
controls for governing will be unworkable). 
173. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing GAO's Option 3 and Canada's 
short-lived efforts to establish a more functionally integrated budgetary proc-
ess, supra notes 123, 129). 
For discussion of proposals for a more integrated functional analysis in 
budgeting, in which budget resources (including budget authority, outlays, di-
rect loans, loan guarantees, and tax expenditures) would be classified in terms 
of the purposes they serve, see Garrett, supra note 146. Professor Garrett de-
scribes the proposal generally as follows: 
Using such a functional approach, lawmakers would first develop gen-
eral categories describing major governmental missions or national 
objectives. They would then decide, based on a determination of the 
country's relative priorities, how much to allot to each function (per-
haps within an overall limitation on spending). Finally, they would 
choose the particular ways in which the allocated resources would be 
delivered to beneficiaries, through tax expenditures, entitlement pro-
grams, or annually appropriated spending. 
Id. at389. 
174. See IMPROVING GoVERNMENTPERFORMANCE, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra 
note 5, at ch. 5, 166-69 & tbl.10-1 (including budget function estimates for 
spending, credit activity, and tax expenditures), 171-287 (discussing programs 
by budget function and incorporating tax expenditures into presentation). 
175. See Garrett, supra note 146, at 389 (observing that, although some 
budget documents include functional presentations, integrated functional 
analysis "is not now an important part offederal budgeting"). 
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require both executive agencies and Congress to determine the ap-
propriate mix of direct and tax expenditure spending within 
amounts allocated to accomplish various priorities, goals, or pur-
poses.176 Institutional obstacles, not least among them congressional 
committee jurisdictional issues, make this major type of change dif-
ficult to accomplish.177 Functional integration of the budget would 
require major adjustments in the institutional structures of Con-
gress and would be greatly resisted.178 
Several more modest techniques have been suggested to accom-
plish regular review of tax expenditures and direct spending pro-
grams as a means of achieving the budget policy objective of evalu-
ating and controlling spending for particular programs. These 
include automatic expiration dates for each program and other pro-
cedures for sunset review.179 
Tax expenditure theorists explain that automatic expiration 
dates provide a "review point" for the program.180 If the review does 
not occur, an expiration date results in automatic termination.181 
Expiration dates place the burden on proponents of a tax expendi-
ture to justify its continued existence in the tax code.182 In theory, 
176. See id. at 425. 
177. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 67-68. Surrey and McDaniel 
proposed that the budget committees "allocate both tax and direct spending by 
functional categories to the appropriations committees (and then to their ap-
propriate subcommittees)" with a total of tax and direct expenditures "assigned 
to each budget function." Id. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that the pro-
posal would represent a "radical departure" from current practice and would 
"severely restrict the largely unchecked budgetary power of the tax-writing 
committees." Id. at 68; see also Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax 
Expenditure Concept and the Legislative Process, in THE ECONOl\UCS OF 
TAXATION 123-44 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (discussing 
the effect of the Congressional Budget Act of 197 4 on the tax legislative process 
during 1976-78 and on committee jurisdiction over tax expenditures). 
178. See Garrett, supra note 146, at 406-15, 432-44 (describing structural 
reforms necessary for Congress to restructure budget packages under more in-
tegrated functional analysis). 
179. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 54-65 (describing various pro-
posals, including staggered five-year termination dates or prescribed review 
schedules for tax expenditure programs or for all tax and direct expenditure 
programs). 
180. See id. at 54. 
181. See id. 
182. See PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 23, at 148. According to Pro-
fessor Surrey, the burden of proof rests heavily on those advocating that the 
government assistance be provided through the tax system. See id. The advan-
tages of using a tax incentive must be "clear and compelling to overcome the 
losses that accompany the use of the tax incentive, even the well-structured in-
centive." Id. at 148-49. Those losses include "confusion and divided authority 
in the legislative and administrative processes, difficulties in maintaining 
budgetary control, confusion in perceiving and setting national priorities, dan-
gers to the tax structure itself." Tax Incentives-Conceptual Criteria, supra 
note 157, at 33; see also Bernard Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support 
of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 172 n.2, 182-86 (1965) (evaluating tax prefer-
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proponents would be required to show a continued need for the pro-
gram and to convince legislators that the tax expenditure, as struc-
tured, is cost effective, fair, and generally preferable to a similar di-
rect grant program..183 
By the mid-1980s, after over a decade of experience, several 
problems with reliance on automatic expiration dates surfaced.184 
For existing tax expenditures, Congress exhibited great reluctance 
(or unwillingness) to impose expiration dates or scheduled reviews 
at all.185 For newer tax expenditures, although Congress imposed 
termination dates on a number of provisions, 186 it extended many of 
them, allowed few to terminate, and failed to conduct meaningful 
review of the effectiveness and continuing need for the particular 
expiring provisions.187 In addition, in the absence of integrated pro-
cedures for committee review by the tax-writing and other commit-
tees, the automatic expiration of tax provisions did not provide an 
effective mechanism to compare an existing tax delivery mechanism 
with an alternative direct spending program..188 
ences by a balancing of the interests of the integrity of the tax system, freedom 
for private action and experimentation, and care and efficiency in the use of 
federally allocated funds). But see Efficiency and Income Taxes, supra note 153, 
at 1023-26 (arguing that the burden of proof should be on opponents of prefer-
ences). 
Under paygo budget procedures, proponents of tax expenditures have the 
additional burden of finding revenue offsets to fund new tax expenditures or the 
extension of expiring tax expenditures. See Harnessing Politics, supra note 51, 
at 516-18, 555-57 (discussing the impact ofpaygo requirements on tax expendi-
tures). 
183. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 54. 
184. See id. at 54-55 (discussing the problems with automatic termination 
dates). 
185. See id. at 55-65 (describing opposition to sunset procedures and to 
scheduled reviews of tax expenditures and direct expenditure programs). 
186. See id. at 54 n.55 (citing as examples two provisions made effective in 
1977-the exclusion for qualified group legal services plans, scheduled to expire 
after 1981, and the residential energy tax credit, scheduled to expire after 
1985); see also I.R.C. § 120(e) (1994) (providing that the exclusion for qualified 
group legal services is not applicable to tax years beginning after June 30, 
1992); former I.R.C. § 23 (1988) (applying residential energy credit to tax years 
beginning after 1983 and ceasing to apply to expenditures made after December 
31, 1985) (repealed 1990). 
187. See, e.g., TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 55; Michael J. Mcintyre, 
A Sunset Bill: A Periodic Reuiew for Tax Expenditures, 4 TAX NOTES 3, 4-5 
(1976) (discussing the need for evaluation of tax expenditures and the unavail-
ability of good data on their performance); Michael J. Mcintyre, lmprouing the 
Legislatiue Process: Cutoff Dates for Tax Benefits, 3 TAX NOTES 5, 5-9 (1975) (ar-
guing that a cutoff date without a study puts little or no pressure on Congress 
to re-evaluate a tax expenditure, citing as an example the extension by Con-
gress of the five-year amortization provisions for pollution control facilities); see 
also I.R.C. § 169 (1994) (allowing a deduction for the amortization of certified 
pollution control facilities based on a sixty month period). 
188. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 55. 
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b. Tax policy reforms. Tax expenditure theory posits that tax 
expenditures reflect fiscal policy decisions to provide financial assis-
tance through the tax system, not "traditional" tax policy deci-
sions.189 However, the presence of tax expenditures in the tax code 
influences the operation of the tax system as a whole, primarily 
through effects on tax rates, 190 complexity of the tax system, 191 and 
tax administration.192 
Tax administration concerns focus primarily on the additional 
management burdens on the tax system and administrators caused 
by the existence of numerous spending programs in the code.193 A 
revenue-raising system, overseen by accountants, tax lawyers, and 
tax administrators, has serious shortcomings as a mechanism for 
administering social benefit programs, such as distributing income 
security funds to low-income workers194 and development funds to 
low-income housing programs.195 On the other hand, sometimes the 
189. See id. at 69-70. Surrey and McDaniel explain as follows: 
Id. 
Tax policy spans a wide range of decisions made in the federal tax sys-
tem [including macroeconomic decisions, microeconomic decisions, 
technical structural decisions, and tax administration decisions] .... 
Other decisions, usually denominated as tax policy, involve provisions 
classified as tax expenditures, owing to the choice of the tax system as 
the vehicle for providing financial assistance. Accordingly, the legisla-
tive and executive processes that produce those decisions are similar 
to those involved in structural tax policy decisions. A government's 
decision to provide assistance through the tax system, however, is 
really a fiscal policy decision disguised as a tax policy decision. Ac-
cordingly the approach and analysis applied should be similar to those 
used in direct budget spending decisions. 
190. See id. at 70. If significant tax expenditures were repealed or cut back 
and were not replaced by direct programs costing an equivalent or greater 
amount, tax rates could be lowered. The presence of many tax expenditures in 
the income tax code narrows the tax base, resulting in higher tax rates unless 
revenue needs are reduced. 
191. See id.; see also Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Income Tax Simplification: 
The Political Process, 34 TAXL. REV. 27, 28 (1978) (discussing the political proc-
ess that results in tax system complexity); Surrey, supra note 160, at 1145-46 
(noting the complexity of a progressive income tax and discussing the role of 
special-treatment provisions); discussion supra at text accompanying notes 160-
63. 
192. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 70. 
193. In addition, the existence of special tax preferences can have a negative 
effect on self assessment of income tax, which depends upon taxpayers' percep-
tions about the fairness of the system. See id. at 94-97. 
194. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limi-
tations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); George K 
Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to 
Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL 'y 225 (1994). 
195. See Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-
Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 872-75 (1993); see also Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998) (de-
scribing the failure of the Treasury Department and state and local credit agen-
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ta.~ system can deliver benefits to businesses and individuals in an 
effective and technically efficient manner.196 Regardless of the ap-
propriateness of using the tax system as a delivery vehicle for spe-
cific types of subsidies, special tax breaks for particular groups and 
industries make tax forms difficult to produce (and for taxpayers to 
complete). In addition, they require tax administrators to issue 
regulations, rulings, and conduct audits of programs outside their 
basic area of expertise. 
Tax expenditure theorists acknowledge that wholesale repeal of 
tax expenditures is neither likely nor desirable because of the need 
to provide government assistance for certain activities.197 However, 
they urge the executive and Congress to review tax expenditure pro-
grams under the same type of methodology applicable to any other 
governmental assistance program.198 Under this analysis, if the 
need for government assistance cannot be established, the tax ex-
penditure simply should be repealed and the revenues involved 
made available for general rate reduction. If there is a need for as-
sistance, the tax expenditure should be compared with a direct 
spending program of similar substantive design. Sometimes a tax 
eA.'Penditure will overlap with or resemble direct grant programs, 
and, in such cases, repeal is easily combined with a transfer of reve-
nues to a direct program. In other cases, time and study will be re-
quired to develop a substitute program. Only when the tax system 
provides a better means of delivering the assistance should the pro-
gram be structured or retained as a tax expenditure, with necessary 
revisions made to improve the effectiveness of the program.199 
In sum, under tax expenditure analysis, tax expenditures re-
quire review and evaluation as spending programs. As spending 
programs, tax expenditures should be evaluated under a traditional 
budget priority and program analysis, with additional analysis of 
cies to operate with regard to civil rights law in administering the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit, currently the largest federal program to fund the develop-
ment and rehabilitation of low-income housing). Cf. Myrna Zelaya-Quesada, 
Housing: Treasury, Justice, HUD Target Discrimination in Low-Income Hous-
ing Tax Credit Projects, 158 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-2 (Aug. 15, 2000) (an-
nouncing a joint agreement by the Treasury, Justice, and Housing and Urban 
Development departments to establish a monitoring and compliance process to 
ensure that low-income housing tax credit projects comply with the Fair Hous-
ing Act, in which the Justice department and HUD will notify the ms and state 
housing finance agencies of enforcement actions brought against tax-credit 
property owners and the ms will notify involved property owners that a finding 
of discrimination could result in the loss of the tax credit). 
196. See Efficiency and Income Taxes, supra note 153, at 1011 (arguing that 
providing benefits through the tax system is a cost-effective method of imple-
menting government policies, particularly in the case of small businesses and 
middle-income taxpayers). 
197. See TA.X EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 98. 
198. See Tax Incentives as a Device, supra note 139, at 713-15 (applying a 
cost-benefit analysis). 
199. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 98. 
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the advantages and disadvantages of using the tax system as a de-
livery mechanism for the expenditures.200 The next section describes 
how current budget rules impede this type oflegislative analysis. 
C. The Impact of Current Budget Rules on Tax Expenditure 
Reforms 
Under Result Act requirements, described in Part I, tax expen-
ditures are included in the presentation of the president's budget to 
Congress under various budget functions.201 However, congressional 
200. See generally Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsi-
dies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 754-58 (1999) (describing and 
criticizing the Treasury Department's analysis in recent budget documents of 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of tax expenditures versus direct 
outlays). Professor Brody summarizes Treasury's description of the advantages 
and disadvantages of tax expenditures as follows: 
The 2000 Budget report begins with the advantages of tax expen-
ditures. First, tax expenditures can be used effectively "when the 
benefit or incentive is related to income and is intended to be widely 
available." Second, tax expenditures can make use of the "existing 
public administrative and private compliance structure for the tax 
system." Third, tax expenditures "help simplify the tax system, as 
where they leave certain income sources untaxed." Fourth, tax rules 
"implicitly subsidize certain activities," although "the beneficiaries 
experience reduced taxes that are offset by higher ta"{eS (or spending 
reductions) elsewhere." Finally, the availability of a 'vide range of tax 
expenditures tools-"e.g., deductions, credits, exemptions, and defer-
rals; floors and ceilings; and phase-ins and phase-outs, dependent on 
income, expenses, or demographic characteristics (age, number of 
family members, etc.)"- "means that tax expenditures can be flexible 
and have very different distributional and cost-effectiveness proper-
ties." 
Next, the administration describes the limitations of tax expendi-
tures. First, they add complexity in some cases, "which can raise both 
administrative and compliance costs." Second, because "the income 
tax system does not gather information on wealth," tax subsidies can-
not be tailored by this attribute. Third, "the tax system may have lit-
tle or no contact with persons who have no or very low incomes, and 
incentives for such persons may need to take the form of refunds." 
Fourth, tax expenditures "do not enable the same degree of agency 
discretion as an outlay program." Finally, "tax expenditures tend to 
escape the budget scrutiny afforded to other programs." 
Id. at 754-55 (footnotes omitted). 
201. See GoVERNMENT-WIDE PERFORMANCE PLAN, in BUDGET, FY 2000, supra 
note 111, at ch. 6, 161, 162-65 & tbl.12-1 (describing the increased emphasis on 
functional presentation of the budget as part of the "reinventing government" 
efforts under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993); see also 
Gene Steuerle, How to Achieve Tax Simplification Through Process Reform, 84 
TAX NOTES 463, 463 (July 19, 1999) (stating that the performance plan review 
"has been extended on an embryonic basis to Treasury's tax expenditure 
budget"); Gene Steuerle, Will Performance Measures Raise the Status of Tax 
Expenditures?, 78 TAX NOTES 939, 940 (Feb. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Performance 
Measures] (arguing that as extended to tax expenditures, performance reviews 
"have the potential of revealing in stark terms exactly what it is in each of these 
programs that works and does not work well" and noting that the Treasury's 
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procedures do not include tax expenditures in the authorization and 
appropriation process.202 Instead, the tax-writing committees con-
sider tax expenditures in meeting the revenue targets set by the 
budget committees.203 Thus, in addition to their revenue-raising and 
tax policy tasks, the tax-writing committees have oversight respon-
sibilities for numerous spending programs operated through the 
code, as well as the equivalent of authorization and appropriations 
power over these programs.204 
These congressional jurisdictional and budgetary structures add 
to the difficulty of achieving more meaningful review of tax expendi-
tures. Formalized budgetary limitations that did not exist when 
Surrey developed the "de-escalation" approach provide additional 
obstacles to an integrated review process.205 As explained below, 
budget tradeoffs are currently made within the two separate pack-
neA.1; efforts will focus on the availability of data); discussion supra Part II.A. 
202. See Performance Measures, supra note 201, at 939. 
203. The budget committees draft and manage the concurrent budget resolu-
tion, which guides the congressional budget process. See Elizabeth Garrett, The 
Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 
COLUl\I. L. REV. 702, 714 (2000) [hereinafter The Congressional Budget Process] 
(describing the budget committees and the budget resolution, the reconciliation 
process, and budget summits as centralized decision making procedures). Under 
this process, as described below, the tax-writing committees propose the mix of 
tax rates and ta.'l: expenditures that will meet revenue targets specified in the 
budget resolution: 
[T]he budget resolution sets spending limits for discretionary pro-
grams (limits which may differ from the caps set by budget laws that 
are binding for sequestration purposes), determines the amount of 
revenue that should be raised in taxes every year, and provides for the 
debt limit. It is a concurrent resolution, so it is not the law and is not 
signed by the president. Its aggregate totals guide the congressional 
budget process, however, and are enforced through parliamentary de-
vices. In addition, accompanying legislative documents contain the 
budget committees' allocations of discretionary funds to the appro-
priations and other committees [the appropriations committees make 
suballocations of discretionary funds to the 13 appropriations sub-
committees]. All these allocations, as well as the spending and reve-
nue aggregates, are enforced through substantive points of order that 
can be raised by any lawmaker to prevent consideration of an appro-
priations bill in violation of the allocations. In the Senate, this sub-
stantive point of order can be waived only by a three-fifths vote, just 
as is required to waive many other objections to violations of budget 
process rules. The political costs of blatantly ignoring the budget 
resolution, even though it is not binding law, may be too great for 
lawmakers to contemplate seriously .... Instead, they must comply or 
engage in the relatively costly behavior of spending the amounts they 
want using complex gimmicks that appear to the public to produce 
bills consistent with spending targets. 
Id. at 715-17 (footnotes omitted). 
204. See McDaniel, supra note 191, at 49-50. 
205. See generally Garrett, supra note 146, at 397-405 (describing the budget 
process and justifications for the current system). 
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ages206 of discretionary spending programs207 and tax and entitle-
ment programs,208 fortifying the jurisdictional and procedural barri-
ers between them. Although the budget procedures have slowed the 
growth of new spending, and thus have played an important budg-
etary control role, they have exacerbated the separation between tax 
expenditures and discretionary programs for purposes of policy 
analysis. 
Budget procedures limit discretionary spending through 
spending caps and certain statutory enforcement procedures.209 Un-
der the spending caps, new discretionary spending programs must 
compete for funds with all discretionary programs within certain 
broad categories and then with all the existing programs within the 
purview of the relevant appropriations subcommittee.210 If the 
spending caps are exceeded, a sequestration211 "reduces spending for 
most programs in the category by a uniform percentage."212 
Paygo provisions control new tax and entitlement legislation.213 
The paygo budget rules limit new tax expenditures214 by requiring 
that they be paid for by new taxes or by offsetting revenue gains 
from modifications to existing tax provisions or to the entitlement 
programs under the jurisdiction of the tax-writing committees.215 
Thus, unlike new discretionary programs, new tax expenditures do 
not need to find revenue offsets in a set of programs that serve the 
same general governmental objectives or set of beneficiaries but in-
stead may be funded by revenue increases, elimination of other un-
206. See supra note 28. For a summary of Budget Enforcement Act proce-
dures, see ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at 448. 
207. See 2 U.S.C. § 900(c)(7) (1994) (defining "discretionary appropriations" 
as discretionary spending programs that receive periodic resources provided by 
appropriation acts). 
208. In referring to entitlement spending, the budget rules use the term "di-
rect spending," defined as "(A) budget authority provided by law other than ap-
propriation Acts; (B) entitlement authority; and (C) the food stamp program." 2 
U.S.C. § 900(c)(8). 
209. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 645 , 901. 
210. See Garrett, supra note 146, at 399. 
211. As budget documents explain, the Budget Enforcement Act ("BEA") re-
quires a "sequestration" procedure for reducing spending in a category "[i]f the 
amount of budget authority provided in appropriations acts for a given year ex-
ceeds the cap on budget authority for a category, or the amount of outlays in 
that year estimated to result from this budget authority exceeds the cap on 
outlays for a category." .ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra 
note 5, at 448. 
212. .ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at 448. 
However, the BEA "specifies special rules for reducing some programs and ex-
empts some programs from sequestration entirely." Id. 
213. See id. 
214. See id. Paygo does not apply to increases in entitlement spending or 
decreases in revenues that are the result of existing provisions. See id. at 449. 
215. See id.; see generally COMM. ONWAYSANDMEANS, 1998 GREENBOOK, SU· 
pra note 30, at vi (describing the major entitlement programs and other activi-
ties within the Committee's jurisdiction). 
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related tax expenditures, or by cuts in certain types of entitlement 
spending programs.216 They cannot be paid for by cuts in discretion-
ary spending programs, however.217 Paygo is enforced by its own in-
dependent sequestration and enforcement provisions.218 
The budget rules discourage the enactment of new discretionary 
spending programs, and provide a reason for enacting expiration 
dates for new tax expenditures that is quite independent of "de-
escalation" or review point efforts.219 During periods of strict budget 
growth limits, new tax expenditures are most easily passed as time-
limited programs because they require lesser offsets.220 Self-
interested legislators, knowledgeable about playing the lobby-
ing/political contribution game in the tax arena, may also prefer to 
supply time-limited legislation, responding to a recurring demand 
for renewal of special interest legislation by playing interest groups 
off each other as they seek to retain current tax expenditures or ob-
tain new ones.221 
216. See Garrett, supra note 146, at 400-01. 
217. See Donald B. Tobin, Symposium, Less is More: A Move Toward Sanity 
in the Budget Process, 16 ST. LOUIS U. Pu:B. L. REV. 115, 126 (1996). 
218. See 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994). The procedures are as follows: 
The BEA sequestration procedures require a uniform reduction of 
mandatory spending programs that are neither exempt nor subject to 
special rules. The BEA exempts social security, interest on the public 
debt, Federal employee retirement, Medicaid, most means-tested enti-
tlements, deposit insurance, other prior legal obligations, and most 
unemployment benefits. A special rule limits the sequestration of 
Medicare spending to no more than four percent, and special rules for 
some other programs limit the size of a sequestration for those pro-
grams. As a result of exemptions and special rules, only about three 
percent of all mandatory spending is subject to sequestration, includ-
ing the maximum amounts allowed under special rules. 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at 448-49. 
219. See Harnessing Politics, supra note 51, at 525-26. 
220. New tax expenditures require revenue offsets within the budget win-
dow time period applicable under the relevant budget process rules. New tax 
expenditures enacted for a lesser time period (for example, for a duration of less 
than five years) would require a lesser total revenue offset. Under current 
rules, new tax expenditures without an expiration date do not require revenue 
offsets outside of the applicable budget window. Accordingly, tax expenditures 
enacted without an expiration date may remain in effect beyond the budget 
window time period without further budgetary review. For those benefited by 
the tax expenditure, a permanent provision is therefore more desirable than an 
e:i..."}liring provision. 
221. See Harnessing Politics, supra note 51, at 504 (arguing that budget 
rules "are a mechanism to harness the interest group activity that is already 
ubiquitous in the tax legislative arena in order to reach substantive policy goals 
more easily," and that interest group conflict "provides lawmakers with oppor-
tunities to review and revise tax subsidies," encouraging them "to provide rea-
sons for their decisions, thus increasing their accountability to the electorate"). 
See generally, e.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTIIlNG: POLITICIANS, 
RENT E:ll.."TRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 86-109 (1997) (describing the pub-
lic choice model of rent extraction and discussing the problem of the durability 
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As noted in the introduction, the recent budget surplus has 
changed the political consensus for the budget process rules, which 
are currently nominally in effect through 2002. 222 This presents an 
opportunity to rethink the sharp budget process demarcation be-
tween tax expenditures and discretionary spending.223 As has been 
demonstrated by past experience, however, efforts to employ a com-
prehensive functional analysis by Congress, of both tax expenditures 
and direct spending programs,224 will not succeed without basic 
changes in the congressional committees' jurisdiction or structures. 
That is quite unlikely to happen anytime soon, but small steps 
taken under the Results Act may ultimately lead in that direction. 
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES A.HEAD: AN ILLUSTRATION 
This Part of the Article examines management and oversight 
experience with a specific set of tax expenditures, employment tax 
credits,225 and their direct expenditure employment subsidy alterna-
tives. These programs provide a valuable experiential perspective 
from which to consider Results Act performance review implementa-
tion issues, discussed in greater detail in the final Part of this Arti-
cle. Employment tax credits illustrate the type of institutional ob-
stacles that have blocked meaningful performance review of tax 
expenditures in the past. Employment tax credits, which have been 
sunsetted and extended by Congress for nearly thirty years, show 
how automatic review points have provided little political constraint 
on the use of tax expenditures. Although sunset provisions were 
proposed by tax expenditure theorists as a way to prompt congres-
sional review of tax expenditures, they have been used under paygo 
primarily as a way of enacting tax provisions with lesser budget off-
sets. Despite the budgetary manipulation of sunset provisions, 
however, some information about the performance of employment 
tax credit programs has been accumulated over the years. For these 
reasons, and others explained below, employment tax credit pro-
grams provide a productive vantage point from which to evaluate 
the prospects for more meaningful review of tax expenditures under 
the Results Act. 
Although the operation of the employment tax credits (and their 
predecessors) has been studied over the years, making available 
of rent extraction agreements). 
222. See supra note 50. 
223. See Garrett, supra note 146, at 397-98. 
224. See discussion supra in Part II.B.2.a. 
225. Most tax experts would categorize the employment tax credits as "tax 
expenditures;" thus, they avoid troublesome definitional difficulties. See, e.g., 
Thuronyi, supra note 137, at 1189 (referring to the now repealed targeted jobs 
tax credit); Efficiency and Income Taxes, supra note 153, at 1034 (referring to 
the targeted jobs tax credit); see also PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 23, 
at 34-35 (referring to a former tax credit for employers hiring public assistance 
recipients from the Department of Labor's welfare training programs). 
2000] REINVENTING TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 799 
empirical data on the programs' effectiveness,226 the data also illus-
trate some inherent difficulties in measuring the results of govern-
ment-funded social programs. Such programs have goals quite dif-
ferent from the profit-oriented business setting from which the 
Results Act performance measures were derived. 
In addition, as the following descriptions of the programs show, 
the tax credits have not been self-administering. These particular 
tax expenditures have many of the characteristics ascribed by tax 
expenditure theorists to direct grant programs funded through ap-
propriations, including visibility, impermanence, and certain de-
tailed eligibility limitations and certification requirements;227 thus, 
they are excellent candidates for substitution by direct grant pro-
grams. Despite regular review by Congress, however, they have not 
been eliminated from the tax code, absorbed by the direct expendi-
ture budget, nor generally accepted by analysts as a subsidy most 
efficiently provided through the tax system. Accordingly, they pro-
vide a particularly challenging context from which to consider 
whether the management and oversight of tax-delivered programs 
could be improved under the emerging Results Act framework. 
The sections below provide an overview of the employment tax 
credits (and their predecessors) as expiring provisions, explain in 
greater detail how the current credits work, summarize the criti-
cisms that have been leveled against employment credits over the 
years, and briefly outline how the most recent form of the credits re-
sponds to these critiques. Despite some modification of the credits 
in recent years, fundamental questions about their effectiveness re-
main. Although various studies have validated these concerns, the 
credits have survived numerous termination dates. The last section 
ends with a discussion of possible explanations for their survival. 
A. Overview: Employment Tax Credits as Expiring Tax 
Expenditures 
Although expiring tax provisions constitute a relatively small 
part of the income tax code as a whole, their use by Congress illumi-
nates the budgetary and programmatic role played by tax expendi-
tures. Unlike other tax provisions, time-limited "expiring" tax pro-
visions automatically terminate unless they are extended by 
Congress. The periodic extension of "expiring'' tax provisions has 
become an established feature of the tax legislative process. 228 
226. See infra Part III.D. 
227. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 170 (describing the varied and over-
lapping nature of ta"!: and direct spending programs; comparing them to each 
other by reference to factors including permanence, eligibility, and quantity, 
that is, whether the expenditures are capped like appropriations or uncapped 
like entitlement programs). 
228. See, e.g., The Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, §§ 
500-512, 113 Stat. 1861 (extending many expiring tax provisions through De-
cember 31, 2001, including the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, the Welfare-to-
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Due in part to revenue offset requirements under congression-
ally self-imposed paygo restrictions,229 the expiration and renewal of 
these provisions have shared some of the characteristics of appro-
priations. 230 Expiring provisions may also be utilized for reasons un-
related to budget reforms. They can be adopted as "pilot" programs 
to test their effectiveness or feasibility.231 They may be used to cap 
or otherwise limit the provision's scope, to phase out a subsidy, or, 
as one commentator has argued, they may signal congressional 
commitment to provide a tax subsidy for a certain minimum length 
of time.232 Despite these similarities to discretionary spending 
Work Tax Credit, the credit for electricity produced from wind and closed-loop 
biomass facilities, expanded to include energy produced from poultry waste, a 
credit for holders of qualified zone academy bonds to help finance construction 
and repair of public schools, the $5000 tax credit for first-time home buyers in 
the District of Columbia, the exclusion for employer-provided undergraduate 
educational assistance, the brownfields remediation expense deduction, a provi-
sion allowing nonrefundable personal tax credits to count against the alterna-
tive minimum tax, an exemption from Subpart F for certain active financing in-
come, a taxable income limit on percentage depletion for marginal production; 
as well as extending the research and development credit through June 30, 
2004); The Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 
1001-04, 112 Stat. 2681-886 (extending many expiring provisions until June 30, 
1999). 
229. See supra Part II.C (describing paygo requirements). 
230. Employment tax credits are revenue-losing, expiring tax provisions. 
Some expiring tax provisions, by contrast, are revenue-raising provisions. For 
example, the overall limitation on certain itemized deductions of upper income 
taxpayers, see I.R.C. § 68 (1994 & Supp. 1998), represented a tax increase when 
it was adopted as part of the 1990 Budget Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11103(a), 
104 Stat. 1388-406. Although § 68 was originally scheduled to expire after De-
cember 31, 1995, the § 68 limitation on itemized deductions became a more 
permanent part of the tax code in 1993. I.R.C. § 68(f), repealed by Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13204, 107 Stat. 462. 
For a discussion how the budget rules make use of such temporary tax in-
creases, see Paint-by-Numbers, supra note 51, at 676: 
Id. 
Budget scorekeeping rules, along with revenue estimating conven-
tions, allow Congress to enact 'temporary' tax increase provisions and 
then to count as revenue gains subsequent extensions of the tempo-
rary provision. This occurs because the 'baseline' estimate of receipts 
does not include revenues from the expiring tax increase. As long as 
the temporary provision does not fund a special budgetary 'trust fund,' 
the revenue loss from the expiration of the tax does not 'score' for 
revenue estimating purposes and the additional revenues from the ex-
tension can thus be spent on other revenue losing enactments. 
231. See Heidi Glenn, Expiring Provisions Never Die, They Just Become 'Ex-
tenders', 73 TAX NOTES 1009, 1010 (1996) (noting that "[t]ypically, the House 
aide said, lack of revenue is the main reason a provision is given temporary 
status, but in some cases, lawmakers want to 'test' a provision.") 
232. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and 
the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1194 (1996) 
(arguing that explicit termination dates serve "as a guaranteed grandfathered 
effective date in the event the provision is not extended" and are a way "of de-
creasing the likelihood of retroactive repeal"). 
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funded through the appropriations process, expiring tax provisions 
remain under the jurisdiction of the congressional tax-writing com-
mittees233 and otherwise represent a subset of tax system issues 
closely related to budget process reforms.234 
Thus, under the current budgetary and political environment, 
these tax provisions import many features of the discretionary ex-
penditure process into the tax legislative process, resulting in 
greater transparency of the budgetary and programmatic conse-
quences of new tax legislation. Although greater transparency rep-
resents a step toward reform, the adoption of an appropriations-type 
model, in supplying new tax expenditure legislation or in extending 
expiring provisions, has not led to more comprehensive reforms. 
The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (''WOTC")235 and the Welfare-
to-Work Tax Credit ("WWTC"),236 like their predecessors the Tar-
geted Jobs Tax Credit and the former credit for welfare-related 
Work Incentive ("WIN") Program expenses, periodically expire and 
then are extended, sometimes retroactively, by Congress. Although 
modified somewhat from the design of their sharply criticized prede-
cessors, the WOTC and WWTC share essential similarities with the 
prior tax credits. They provide time-limited employer wage subsi-
dies for certain low wage or difficult-to-place workers.237 
233. The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees have ju-
risdiction over tax provisions as well as major entitlement programs, including 
social security, medicare and numerous other programs providing social welfare 
benefits. See COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1998 GREENBOOK, supra note 30, at 
vi. 
234. See supra note 51. 
235. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit, l.R.C. § 51 (1994 & Supp. 1998), en-
acted by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, replaced the targeted 
jobs ta'!: credit. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
§ 1201, 110 Stat. 1755, 1768-72 (applying to individuals who begin work for the 
employer after September 30, 1996 and before October 1, 1997). It was ex-
tended by the Ta..'!:payer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 603, 111 Stat. 
788, 862 (applying to individuals who begin work for the employer after Sep-
tember 30, 1997 and before July 1, 1998), by the Tax and Trade Relief Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1002, 112 Stat. 2681-888 (applying to individuals 
who begin work for the employer after June 30, 1998 and before July 1, 1999), 
and again by the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 505, 113 Stat. 1860 (applying to individuals who begin 
work after June 30, 1999, and before January 1, 2002). 
236. The Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit, l.R.C. § 51A (Supp. 1998), was en-
acted by the Tro..-payer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 80l(a), 111 Stat 
788, 869-71 (applying to individuals who begin work for the employer after De-
cember 31, 1997 and before May 1, 1999). It was extended by the Tax and 
Trade Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1003, 112 Stat. 2681-888 (ap-
plying to individuals who begin work for the employer after December 31, 1997, 
and before July 1, 1999), and extended again by the Ticket to Work and Work 
Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 505, 113 Stat. 1860 
(applying to individuals who begin work after June 30, 1999, and before Janu-
ary 1, 2002). 
237. This analysis focuses on the WOTC and the WWTC. Other employer 
802 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
The WOTC, enacted in 1996, targets eight categories of difficult-
to-place or low skilled workers such as high risk or summer youths 
living in empowerment zones or enterprise communities, ex-felons, 
vocational rehabilitation referrals, food stamp recipients, qualified 
veterans, SSI recipients, and families eligible to receive welfare 
tax credits provide targeted wage subsidies for more geographically restricted 
worker populations, including the Empowerment Zone Employment Credit, 
I.RC. § 1396 (1994 & Supp. 1998), and the Indian Employment Credit, I.RC. § 
45A (1994 & Supp. 1998), which is currently scheduled to expire after December 
31, 2003, see I.R.C. § 45A(f) (1994 & Supp. 1998). Both credits are part of the 
general business credit. See I.RC. § 38(b)(9), (10) (1994 & Supp. 1998). See 
generally BORIS I. BITl'KER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF !NCO.ME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS, '1I 27.3.3, at 27-39 to -40 (3d ed. 1999) (describing employ-
ment credits). 
The Empowerment Zone Employment Credit provides a credit for portions 
of wages of employees who live and work in "empowerment zones," areas desig-
nated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (urban areas) or the 
Secretary of Agriculture (rural areas) to have high levels of poverty, unemploy-
ment, and distress, and which meet certain other requirements. See I.RC. §§ 
1391, 1392 (1994 & Supp. 1998). See generally, e.g., EZ Gazette (EZ project web 
site) (visited Sept. 9, 2000) <http://www.richmond.edu/-ezprojl> (providing re-
sources and links to other web sites). In 1993, the Secretaries were authorized 
to designate six urban and three rural areas as empowerment zones. See Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13301, 107 Stat. 
312, 543 (1993). In 1997, two additional urban areas were authorized. See 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 951(a)(l)-(3), 111 Stat. 788, 
885 (1997) (stating that the designation is not to take effect before January 1, 
2000). For the original empowerment zones, the credit is 20% of the first 
$15,000 of the wages of each qualifying employee for the calendar years 1994 
through 2001, 15% for 2002, 10% for 2003, 5% for 2004, and zero thereafter. 
For the two additional zones designated under the 1997 authorization, the ap-
plicable percentages are 20% for 2000 through 2004, 15% for 2005, 10% for 
2006, 5% for 2007, and zero thereafter. See I.RC. § 1396(b) (1994 & Supp. 
1998). See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1341 (1993) (discussing pre-1993 proposals and design issues); Michael 
Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields Recycling and Federal En-
terprise Zoning, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 495, 498-503 (1998) (describing two 
decades of state and federal enterprise zones). 
The Indian Employment Credit provides a credit for certain employers who 
employ a "qualified employee," defined generally as an enrolled member of an 
Indian tribe (or a spouse of an enrolled member) who lives and works on or near 
the reservation and receives wages not in excess of $30,000 (acljusted for infla-
tion after 1994) for the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 45A(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
The amount of the credit is equal to 20% of the amount by which the sum of 
wages and health insurance costs for all qualified employees for the taxable 
year exceed the sum of wages and health insurance costs for such employees for 
the calendar year 1993 (the year before the effective date of the credit). See 
I.RC. § 45A(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13322(b), 107 Stat. 559, 563 (1994) (applying to 
wages paid or incurred after December 31, 1993). The aggregate amount of 
wages and health insurance costs taken into account for any employee cannot 
exceed $20,000, for either the taxable year or the 1993 base period year. See 
I.RC. § 45A(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
2000] REINVENTING TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 803 
benefits.238 The WWTC, enacted in 1997, more narrowly targets 
workers who have received welfare benefits during the previous two-
year period.239 Employers receive a tax credit for hiring former wel-
fare recipients who have left welfare for work under time limits es-
tablished by welfare reform legislation adopted by Congress in 
1996.240 
As noted above, the WOTC replaced the Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit ("TJTC") , which was enacted in 1978, and periodically lapsed 
and renewed until it was finally allowed to expire in 1994.241 The 
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit replaced the New Jobs Credit, which was 
enacted in 1977 and allowed to expire in 1978.242 The WWTC de-
scends from a former tax credit, terminated in the early eighties, for 
238. See I.R.C. § 51(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
239. The credits do not provide duplicate benefits. If an employer receives a 
WWTC for an employee for a particular taxable year, no WOTC credit may be 
taken for the employee for that year. See I.R.C. §51A(e) (Supp. 1998). 
240. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-13, 2137 (repealing the 
individual entitlement to welfare and imposing a twenty-four month limit on 
welfare benefits without work and a sixty month lifetime cap on benefits). 
241. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 321, § 554, 92 Stat. 
2763, 2830, 2892 (enacting the targeted jobs tax credit and requiring the Secre-
taries of Labor and the Treasury to report to Congress by June 30, 1981, on its 
effectiveness in improving employment of the targeted groups). The TJTC was 
extended by Congress in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991. 
See Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 105, 105 Stat. 1686, 1687; 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 11001, 11405, 104 
Stat. 1388, 1388-473; Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 
7103, 103 Stat. 2106, 2305; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4010, 102 Stat. 3342, 3655; Ta."{ Reform Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-514, § 1701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2772; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-369, § 1041, 98 Stat. 494, 1042; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 233, 96 Stat. 324, 501; Economic Recovery 
Ta."{ Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 261, 95 Stat. 172, 260. In 1993, the tar-
geted jobs tax credit was retroactively renewed after expiring again on June 30, 
1992, and was extended through December 31, 1994. See Revenue Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13102, 107 Stat. 312, 420. 
242. See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 
Stat. 126; see also Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. Law. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763; 
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-1800, at 231-34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6761, 7231-35 (1978) (describing the new targeted job credit adopted in 1978 
and the discontinuation of the new jobs credit); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-263, at 
26-27 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 185, 291-92 (describing the new 
jobs credit, adopted in 1977, of 50% of the increase in each employer's unem-
ployment insurance wage base above 102% of that wage base in the previous 
year, as limited by various caps, and an additional credit equal to 10% of the 
first $4200 of unemployment insurance wages paid to handicapped individuals, 
including handicapped veterans, who receive vocational rehabilitation). For a 
description of the political origins of the New Jobs Tax Credit and its replace-
ment by the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, see HOWARD, supra note 33, at 75-82, 
and Emil M. Sunley, A Tax Preference Is Born: A Legislative History of the New 
Jobs Tax Credit, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 391-408 (Henry J. Aaron & Mi-
chael J. Boskin eds., 1980). 
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wages paid welfare recipients under the Work Incentive (''WIN") 
Program.243 Congress established WIN in 1967244 and modified it 
during the early seventies to place certain welfare recipients in 
jobs.245 For the ten-year period from 1972 through 1981, the WIN-
welfare recipient tax credit allowed an employer a tax credit for 
wages paid to eligible employees up to specified percentages of their 
compensation during the first two years of employment. 246 After 
243. See HOWARD, supra note 33, at 190 (explaining that the WIN tax credit 
was initiated by conservative Democrat Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia 
as an alternative to increased spending for the Job Corps and other Great Soci-
ety job-training programs). 
244. Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204, 81 Stat. 884. Work requirements were im-
posed on AFDC recipients under WIN, but were not very effective due to weak 
funding and enforcement. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, 
THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 141-42 
(WIN I), 156-58 (WIN II). 
245. Although potentially subject to the original WIN work requirements, 
mothers with preschool children were determined by many states to be "inap-
propriate" for job training or work and thus as exempt from the work require-
ment. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL 
WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 341 (1988) (attributing 
the exemption to limited funding, a lack of child care, and an excess of welfare 
recipients over WIN slots). As amended in 1971, WIN II required participation 
by mothers with children six years of age or older. See HANDLER & HAsENFELD, 
supra note 244, at 154. The WIN program was replaced by the JOBS program, 
enacted as part of the revision of the AFDC program by the Family Support Act 
of 1988 to assist parents in obtaining education, training, and employment 
needed to avoid long-term welfare dependence. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-
998, at 91, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2879 (1988). The JOBS pro-
gram was eliminated in 1996, along with the federal entitlement to welfare. 
See supra note 240. 
246. Former I.R.C. §§ 40, 50.A, 50B (1976). The WIN tax credit was adopted 
by the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. Law No. 92-178, § 601, 85 Stat. 497, 553-560 
(applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1971). The credit was 
terminated in 1981, see former I.R.C. § 50B(a)(5) (providing that the credit did 
not apply to amounts paid or incurred after 1981), but was not statutorily re-
pealed until 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 474(m)(l), (2), 98 Stat. 494, 833 
(1984). Prior to its termination, the credit was for 50% of the first $6000 of 
wages paid to each eligible employee during the first year of employment and 
25% of the first $6000 paid during the second year. Nonbusiness employees 
(household workers) qualified for the credit at a reduced rate of 35% for the first 
year for a maximum amount of $12,000 wages paid, and second-year wages did 
not qualify for the credit. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1978, the credit was 20%, 
plus full deduction, for wages paid in the first year of employment to each eligi-
ble employee. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-1800, at 232-33, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7198, 7233 (1978) (limiting the amount of the credit to $50,000 of 
tax liability plus one-half of tax liability in excess of $50,000, an increase over 
the originally enacted limits of $25,000, and relaxing the employment duration 
requirements); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 94-120, at 65 (1975), reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 122, 130 (expanding the eligible employees to include AFDC re-
cipients, regardless of WIN enrollment, provided they met certain specified em-
ployment duration requirements in addition to extending the credit to nonbusi-
ness employment); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 92-708 (1971), reprinted in 1971 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2053, 2074-75 (requiring the employer to retain a WIN program 
2000] REINVENTING TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 805 
1981, Congress included the WIN tax credit in modified form as part 
of the TJTC.247 Thus, in their various permutations, these kinds of 
employment tax credits have been included in the tax expenditure 
budget since its inception.248 
B. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (''WOTC'} 
The WOTC249 is intended to "provide an important incentive for 
employers to undertake the expense of providing jobs and training 
to economically disadvantaged individuals, many of whom are un-
derskilled and/or undereducated."250 It provides the employer a 
employee for at least one year after completion of the first twelve months of 
employment, unless the employee left voluntarily, was disabled, or was termi-
nated for misconduct). 
247. See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 261, 95 Stat. 
172, 260-61, 263. 
248. For recent tax expenditure budgets showing the WWTC and WOTC as 
tax expenditures, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMlTI'EE ON TAXATION, ESTil\IATES 
OF FEDERAL TA.'\: EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000-2004 (JCS-13-99), De-
cember 22, 1999, reprinted in 86 TAX NOTES 103, 116 (2000) [hereinafter JCT 
TAX EXPENDITURE ESTil\IATES FOR FY 2000-2004]; ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, in 
BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at ch. 5, 107, 110 tbl.5.1 (listing Work Opportu-
nity and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credits). For earlier tax expenditure budgets 
showing the credits' predecessors, see, for example, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, OMB, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GoVERNl\IBNT FISCAL YEAR 1980, Part 2, Special Analysis G, 183, 203, 209 tbl.G-
1 (showing the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
OMB, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNl\IBNT FISCAL 
YEAR 1979, pt. 2, Special Analysis G, 148, 159 tbl.G-1, 165 (showing the New 
Jobs Credit); and EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB, SPECIAL 
ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNl\IBNT FISCAL YEAR 1976, Part 
1, Special Analysis F, 101, 108 tbl.F-1, 112 (showing the WIN tax credit). 
249. The WOTC is structured as part of the general business credit. See 
I.R.C. §§ 51(a) and 38(b)(2). A number of credits are combined into the general 
business credit for the purpose of computing how much of each credit will be 
allowed in a given year and in carryback and carryover years. See I.R.C. §§ 
38(c), (d), 39. 
250. S. REP. No. 104-281, at 32-33 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1474, 1506-07. 
The bill creates a new program whose design will focus on individuals 
with poor workplace attachments, streamline administrative burdens, 
promote longer-term employment, and thereby reduce costs relative to 
the prior-law program. The Committee intends that this short-term 
program will provide the Congress and the Treasury and Labor De-
partments an opportunity to assess fully the operation and effective-
ness of the new credit as a hiring incentive. 
Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 205-07 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1697-99 (generally following the Senate amendment); 
Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 3448, 32 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1475 (Aug. 26, 1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1862, 
1863 (1996). 
The Act provides a significant incentive for employers to hire people 
from certain targeted groups most in need of jobs, such as high-risk 
youth. I am pleased to see improvements that address many of the 
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credit of forty percent of the first $6000 of qualified first year 
wages251 paid to an employee who completes at least 400 hours of 
service for the employer, with a smaller percentage applicable for 
fewer hours of service.252 The maximum credit for each targeted em-
ployee is $2400 (forty percent of $6000). 253 
Each individual employee must be certified by the "designated 
local agency''254 to be a member of one of the eligible targeted groups. 
The employer must receive a certification from a designated local 
agency by the time the employee begins work, or the employer must 
complete a "pre-screening notice" not later than the day the em-
ployee is offered employment.255 The "pre-screening notice," Form 
8850, signed by both the employer and the employee, must be sub-
mitted to the agency as part of a written request for certification 
from the agency within twenty-one days after the employee begins 
work.256 
Certain limitations on the availability of the credit restrict its 
non-business use. The credit cannot be used for wages paid to an 
employee who is related to or a dependent of the employer or to an 
Id. 
concerns raised about implementation of the TJTC. For example, the 
minimum employment period required before an employer becomes 
eligible for the credit will promote longer, more meaningful work ex-
periences for those hired. 
251. Wages are defined by reference to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
("FUTA"). I.R.C. § 51(c)(l) (referring to § 3306(b)). As with the WWTC, "quali-
fied first-year wages" means wages attributable to services "rendered during 
the 1-year period beginning with the day the individual begins work for the em-
ployer." I.R.C. § 51(b)(2). 
252. See I.R.C. §§ 51(a), (b), (i)(3). The credit percentage is reduced to 25% of 
those wages for employees who perform at least 120 hours, but less than 400 
hours, of service for the employer. See I.R.C. § 51(i)(3)(A). No wages are taken 
into account unless the employee has performed at least 120 hours of service for 
the employer. See I.R.C. § 51(i)(3)(B). 
253. No deduction is allowed for the employee's wages to the extent of the 
amount of the credit., See I.R.C.§ 280C(a). This limitation also applies to the 
WWTC. See I.R.C. § 51A(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). This prevents the combination 
of the wage deduction and the credit from providing a tax benefit in excess of 
the amount of wages actually paid, and is similar in effect to making the tax 
credit taxable. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 41, 111. For example, 
for each eligible worker, a corporate employer in the 35% tax bracket would 
gain a maximum $2400 credit and would lose a deduction of $2400, worth $840 
(35% x $2400) to that employer. See I.R.C. § 280C(a). The overall effect is thus 
the same as making the tax credit itself taxable. 
254. I.R.C. § 51(d)(ll) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (referring to a State employ-
ment security agency). 
255. Id. § 51(d)(12)(A). 
256. Id. § 51(d)(12)(A)(ii)(II). If a certificate is later determined to be incor-
rect due to false information provided by the employee, the agency must revoke 
the certification, and wages paid after the employer receives notice of revocation 
will not be treated as qualified wages. See id. § 51(d)(12)(B). If the agency de-
nies a request for certification, it must provide a written explanation of the rea-
sons for denying the request. See id. § 51(d)(12)(C). 
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individual who is more than a fifty percent owner of the business.257 
More than half of the employee's work must be in the employer's 
trade or business for remuneration paid by the employer to the em-
ployee to be taken into account.258 
If the employer previously employed the employee at any time 
prior to the hiring date, then the employee's wages may not be taken 
into account for the purpose of computing the credit.259 Other limita-
tions respond to concerns about interactions with other federally-
financed job training and subsidy programs,260 with hiring replace-
ments during labor disputes,261 and with preventing circumvention 
by employers of the credit wage ceiling and other limitations on the 
availability of the credit.262 No credit is generally allowed for tax-
exempt organizations.263 
C. The Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit (''WWTC'} 
The WWTC264 is intended to "ease the transition from welfare to 
work for the targeted categories of individuals by increasing access 
to employment."265 It provides the employer a credit amount of 35% 
257. See id. § 51(i). This limitation also applies to the WWTC. See id. § 
51A(d)(l) (cross-referencing I.R.C. § 51(i)). 
258. See id. § 51(f). This limitation also applies to the WWTC. See id. § 
51A(d)(l) (Supp. IV 1998) (cross-referencing I.R.C. § 51(f)). 
259. See id.§ 51(i)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), as amended by Ticket to Work 
and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 505(b), 
113 Stat. 1860, 1921 (striking "during which he was not a member of a targeted 
group"). 
260. No credit is available for wages for any period during which the em-
ployer receives federally funded payments for on-the-job training for the em-
ployee. See I.R.C. § 51(c)(2)(A). Wages otherwise eligible for the credit are re-
duced by the amount of work supplementation payments received by the 
employer under the Social Security Act with respect to the employee. See id. § 
51(c)(2)(B). 
261. Wages paid to employees hired to work at a plant or facility of the em-
ployer during a period when a strike or lockout involves the employees at the 
plant or facility are not eligible for the credit if they are paid for services "the 
same as, or substantially similar to, services performed by employees partici-
pating in, or affected by, the strike or lockout." I.R.C. § 51(c)(3) . 
262. All members of the same controlled group of corporations are treated as 
employed by a single employer, and the WOTC credit with respect to each 
member is its proportionate share of the wages giving rise to the credit. There 
are similar rules for unincorporated businesses under common control. See 
I.R.C. § 52 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Similar rules apply to the WWTC. See id. § 
51A(d)(l) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (cross-referencing I.R.C. § 52). 
263. See I.R.C. § 52(c) (excluding cooperatives described in I.R.C. § 521); see 
also id. § 51A(d)(l) (Supp. IV 1998) (noting that the rules are applicable also to 
WWTC). 
264. Like the WOTC, the WWTC is structured as part of the general busi-
ness credit. See id. §§ 51A(d)(2) and 38(b)(2). 
265. H.R. REP. No. 105-148, at 383 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
678, 777 (stating that "[i]t is also intended to provide certain employee benefits 
to these individuals to encourage training, health coverage, dependent care and 
ultimately better job attachment"); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-220, at 
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of the first $10,000 of "qualified first-year wages" and 50% of the 
first $10,000 of "qualified second-year wages."266 Employers thus 
may be eligible for a maximum credit per qualified employee of 
$8500 over a two-year period, beginning with the employee's first 
day of work.267 Wages are "qualified" if paid to employees who are 
''long-term family assistance recipients."268 Eligible wages include 
cash wages paid to an employee plus amounts paid by the employer 
for certain health plan coverage,269 educational assistance,270 and de-
pendent care assistance271 for the employee. 
Each individual employee must be certified by the designated 
local agency272 as coming within one of the three targeted categories 
of ''long-term family assistance recipients,"273 under rules similar to 
those that apply to the WOTC.274 The categories generally include 
members of families: (1) receiving temporary assistance to needy 
families (''TANF"-the successor program to AFDC) for at least 18 
consecutive months ending on the hiring date;275 (2) receiving such 
assistance for a total of 18 months (whether or not consecutive) be-
ginning after the credit's enactment date (August 5, 1997) if they are 
hired within two years after the date that the 18-month total is 
reached;276 or (3) ceasing to be eligible for such assistance by reason 
of any time limits imposed by state or federal law, and having a 
hiring date not more than two years after the cut-off of assistance.277 
The WWTC is coordinated with the WOTC278 and cross refer-
440-41 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1129, 1252-53 (following the 
House bill); Statement of President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2014, 
33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1192 (Aug. 11, 1997), reprinted in 1997 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620-1, 1620-3 (stating that the WWTC "is designed to generate 
new job opportunities for long-term welfare recipients"). 
266. I.R.C. § 51A(a). 
267. See id. § 51A(b)(2),(3). 
268. Id. § 51A(b)(l). 
269. See id. § 51A(b)(5)(B)(i), (ii) (covering the reasonable cost of coverage for 
the period, but not more than the applicable premium defined under I.R.C. § 
4980B(f)( 4)). 
270. See id. § 51A(b)(5)(B)(iii) (relating to educational assistance excludable 
from gross income under I.R.C. § 127, or that would be excludable but for the 
expiration date of§ 127(d)). 
271. See id. § 51A(b)(5)(B)(iv) (relating to dependent care assistance pro-
grams under I.R.C. § 129). 
272. See id. § 51A(c)(l) (defined by reference to §5l(d)(ll) as a state em-
ployment security agency). 
273. Id. § 51A(c)(l). 
27 4. Id. § 51A(d)(l); see also discussion supra Part III.B. 
275. See id. § 51A(c)(l)(A). 
276. See id. § 51A(c)(l)(B). 
277. See id. § 51A(c)(l)(C). 
278. See id. § 51A(e) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that if a WWTC is allowed to 
an employer with respect to an individual employee for the taxable year, then 
the employee cannot be treated as a member of a targeted group for purposes of 
the WOTC credit for the taxable year). 
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ences numerous definitions and other limitations from the WOTC.279 
Each year, the employer may choose the credit that provides the 
greater tax benefit.28° For example, if the WOTC is selected for a 
taxable year, the WWTC may be chosen by the employer for the fol-
lowing taxable year if the covered period from the work beginning 
date for first-year or second-year wages has not yet been com-
pleted.281 
D. Congressional Responses to Program Performance 
The purpose of this subpart is not to evaluate the operation of 
the employment tax credit programs themselves, which has been or 
is being done elsewhere,282 but to focus on the legislative response to 
the concerns and criticism generated by past evaluations. Congress 
has reenacted these expiring tax credits on a regular basis, adjust-
ing and modifying them somewhat, but keeping their basic form 
fairly constant over the last several decades. As described below, 
Congress revived them again in the wake of major welfare reform 
legislation despite substantial criticism of the credits from public 
policy experts. 
Under tax expenditure analysis, it is important to separate the 
question of whether employment subsidies should be provided at all 
from the question of whether, if provided, they should be delivered 
through the tax system or more directly through a direct expendi-
ture program. Although the placement of a subsidy within the in-
come tax code may mask the need for recurring policy analysis of the 
subsidy, Surrey argued that this would less likely be the case if the 
279. See id. § 51A(b)(5)(A), § 51A(b)(5)(C), § 51A(c)(l),(2), § 51A(d) (Supp. IV 
1998). Like the WOTC, the WWTC is also coordinated with the empowerment 
zone employment credit. See id. §§ 51A(d)(2), 1396(c)(3) (providing that the 
same wages cannot be taken into account for multiple credits and that the 
$15,000 per calendar year per worker limit of wages to be taken into account for 
purposes of the empowerment zone employment credit is reduced by the wages 
taken into account for the calendar year in determining the WWTC or the 
WOTC credit). For a description of the Empowerment Zone Employment 
Credit, see supra note 237. 
280. See I.R.C. §§ 51G), 51A(d)(l) (providing that an employer may elect out 
of having the credit apply for any taxable year). The election may be made (or 
revoked) at any time before the expiration of the three-year period beginning on 
the last date for filing the return for the taxable year (without regard to exten-
sions). See id. § 51G)(2). 
281. See I.R.S. Notice 97-54, 1997-2 C.B. 307 (providing examples); see also 
I.R.S. Notice 99-51, 1999-40 I.R.B. 447 (describing the operation of the credits 
when an individual is employed by more than one employer in the process of 
moving from welfare to work). 
282. The predecessor programs of WOTC and WWTC were studied and ex-
tensively criticized. Although some of the same criticisms apply to the WOTC 
and WWTC programs given the similarity in design, it is too early to tell 
whether these programs will suffer from the same low participation rates and 
ineffectiveness of the earlier programs. Preliminary information gives cause for 
concern. See infra text accompanying notes 311-12. 
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subsidy provision were enacted with a termination date because the 
program would automatically expire in the absence of congressional 
review.283 Congressional review, in theory, should begin with con-
sideration of the need for a subsidy and whether the subsidy could 
meet its goals in a cost-effective way.284 The discussion below as-
sumes a need for improving targeted group employment levels and 
wages, and focuses instead on the question of whether the subsidies 
meet their goals. 
1. Reviving Employer Wage Subsidies 
Employment subsidies are intended by proponents to raise 
wages and employment levels as a means of improving the welfare 
of low-income families and their communities.285 A recent compre-
hensive analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature on em-
ployment subsidies concludes that such subsidies, including em-
ployment tax credits, are quite problematic, and argues that their 
supporters have overstated the case for new employment subsi-
dies.286 At the level of economic theory, Professor Anne L. Alstott 
points out that employment subsidies are risky because they "re-
quire sustained intervention in labor-market processes that are lit-
tle understood."287 At the level of practice, after reviewing the litera-
283. See Ta,x Incentives As a Device, supra note 139, at 738. 
284. See supra discussion Part II.B. 
285. See, e.g., EDMUND s. PHELPS, REWARDING WORK: How TO RESTORE 
PARTICIPATION AND SELF-SUPPORT TO FREE ENTERPRISE 105-21 (1997) (proposing 
a graduated wage subsidy for all low-wage workers to increase employment lev-
els and raise wages); Robert H. Haveman & John Karl Scholz, Transfers, Ta.xes, 
and Welfare Reform, 47 NAT'LTAXJ. 417, 428-30 (1994) (proposing a permanent 
employment subsidy modeled on the New Jobs Tax Credit in effect during 1977-
78); see also JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: 
WORK, POVERTY, & WELFARE 106-12 (1997) (discussing wage subsidies); Joel F. 
Handler, Low-Wage Work ''As We Know It": What's Wrong/What Can Be Done, 
in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 3, 12-16 (Joel F. 
Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999) (discussing ways of increasing wages and 
employment levels for low-wage workers, including the earned income tax 
credit, wage subsidies, family allowances, and raising the minimum wage). 
286. See Anne L. Alstott, Work us. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employ-
ment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 1019, 1056-58 (1999) (proposing instead a 
program of unconditional cash grants); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE 
ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 4-5 (1999) (explaining and defending their 
proposal of providing each citizen, upon reaching adulthood, with a one-time 
grant of $80,000, financed by an annual 2% wealth tax); ROBERT HAVEMAN, 
STARTING EVEN: AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE NATION'S NEW 
POVERTY 168-71 (1988) (developing an idea, proposed in 1968 by Nobel Prize 
winner Professor James Tobin of an "endowment" account or a "universal capi-
tal" account that would be assigned to all youths upon graduation from high 
school, which could be used to support certain human capital investments of 
their choice). 
287. Alstott, supra note 286, at 1019-29 (discussing the uncertain economics 
of employment subsidies and the problems of windfall and displacement); see 
also Yin et al., supra note 194, at 291 (stating that, "Concerns expressed about 
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ture on past programs (including the New Jobs Credit and its suc-
cessor, the TJTC), Alstott observes that most such programs have 
been "notable failures," difficult to design, and subject to interest-
group capture and taxpayer manipulation and concluded that "their 
benefits for workers have been, by most accounts, slim to none."288 
In the face of such evidence, accumulated over long experience 
with such programs,289 why did Congress revive these subsidies in 
the late nineties? Part of the answer may be found in political con-
cerns generated by higher profile legislative initiatives aimed at 
welfare recipients. The Clinton administration pushed for the 
WOTC and the WWTC as a way of buttressing efforts to move wel-
fare recipients into jobs under major welfare legislation signed in 
1996.290 They fit 'vithin the president's (and congressional) political 
priorities in "ending welfare."291 In addition, in justifying its propos-
als, the administration's analysis directly addressed and responded 
to some of the major criticism of past programs.292 
Two of the major criticisms of the TJTC, the predecessor of the 
WOTC, were that the credit resulted in windfall gains for employers 
because they were subsidized for doing what they would have done 
anyway in the absence of the program (employ low-wage, low-skilled 
workers in high-turnover labor-intensive businesses),293 and that it 
the TJTC include the possibility of windfall gains to the firm with little benefit 
obtained by workers, and the 'substitution effect' where subsidized workers 
merely replace unsubsidized workers or workers whose subsidy has expired, 
with little increase in overall employment"). 
288. Alstott, supra note 286, at 1019, 1029-42 (discussing "pitfalls" in policy 
design of incremental and targeted subsidies, although acknowledging that an 
impossible degree of precision should not be demanded); see also, e.g., Yin et al., 
supra note 194, at 291-93. Yin cites studies of the TJTC and concludes as fol-
lows: 
mts start and stop history, the limited duration of the subsidy to a 
portion of first year wages, the highly targeted nature of the subsidy 
directed towards individuals who undoubtedly are the subject of nega-
tive stereotyping, and the required participation of both the firm and 
the worker for the tax benefit to be available-may help to explain the 
program's ineffectiveness and low participation rate. 
Id. at292. 
289. For a description of the proponents and opponents of the TJTC and its 
political history in relationship to direct employment and training programs, 
see HOWARD, supra note 33, at 161-72. 
290. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
291. William J. Clinton, Remarks by President Clinton at the Welfare Re-
form Bill Signing (Aug. 22, 1996) (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.acf.dhhs. 
gov/news/welfare/wr/822potus.htm>. 
292. See JOINT ECONOl\llC COMJ.VI., U.S. CONGRESS, THE WELFARE-TO-WORK 
TA.'\: CREDIT 1, 6-9 (Mar. 1997) [hereinafter JOINT ECONOl\llC COJ\c1M. WWTC 
REPORT] (responding to the administration's analysis of proposed changes). 
293. Large employers in the restaurant, retail, hotel, nursing home, and 
chicken processing industries, as well as management assistance and consult-
ing firms that helped those businesses with the necessary certifications and 
filings, were viewed as important lobbying forces in keeping the TJTC alive 
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provided little or no improvement in the long-term job prospects of 
the covered workers.294 Some aspects of the WOTC and WWTC were 
explicitly designed to mitigate those criticisms, including the 
reformulation of some target groups, the modification of the certifi-
cation process, the lengthening of the minimum employment periods 
for maximum credit receipt, and the increase in the subsidy amount 
to offset expected employer reluctance to hire long-term welfare re-
cipients. 295 In addition, some administration officials suggested that 
combining targeted wage subsidies with a constellation of other job 
retention services, such as child care and transportation, would im-
prove their effectiveness.296 
from 1978 to 1994. See HOWARD, supra note 33, at 164-65, 172; EDWARD C. 
LORENZ, NATIONAL COMM'N FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY, THE TARGETED JOBS TAX 
CREDITINMARYLANDANDMISSOURI: 1982-1987, RESEARCHREP. No. 88-18, at 74-
75 (1988) (discussing lobbying by TJTC management assistance companies); see 
also Harnessing Politics, supra note 51, at 521-22 (discussing lobbying activity 
by companies engaged in assisting firms with TJTC administration). 
294. See, e.g., TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. 
ON SELECT REVENUE MEAsURES OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103d Cong. 
76, 77 (1994) (containing the testimony of Robert B. Reich, Secretary, U.S. Dep't 
of Labor, stating that "the Administration has not sought an extension ofTJTC 
in its present form" and summarizing the results of fourteen studies of the pro-
gram over fifteen years); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEF'T OF LABOR, 
TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT PROGR.Afvi: EMPLOYMENT INDUCEMENT OR EMPLOYER 
WINDFALL, REP. No. 04-94-021-03-320, 16-32 (Aug. 1994) [hereinafter TARGETED 
JOBS TAX CREDIT PROGRAM REPORT) (recommending that, after an audit of pro-
gram year 1991, the TJTC be discontinued after its expiration); see also U.S. 
DEP'TS OF LABOR & TREAsURY, THE USE OF TAX SUBSIDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT 4-7 
(May 1986) [hereinafter 1986 TREAsURY EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES REPORT] 
(evaluating the New Jobs Tax Credit and the initial Targeting Jobs Tax Credit 
in effect from 1979-81). 
295. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EMPLOYl\iENT TAX CREDITS 
EXPIRING DURING THE 106TH CONGRESS, updated Dec. 21, 1999, reprinted in CRS 
Reports on Welfare-to-Work and Work Opportunity Tax Credits (Doc. 2000-828, 
Release Date: Jan. 04, 2000), 2000 TNT 3-27 (Jan. 5, 2000) [hereinafter CRS 
EMPLOYl\iENT TAX CREDIT REPORT); JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. WWTC REPORT, su-
pra note 292, at 6-9 (responding to the administration's analysis of proposed 
changes); see also Alstott, supra note 286, at 1036-38 (discussing the specific 
changes from prior law and noting some additional problems created by the 
changes). 
296. See Robert Pear, Clinton Will Seek Tax Break to Ease Path Off Welfare, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at Al (quoting senior advisers to President Clinton 
for the administration's view that the new tax credit would be more effective 
than earlier versions as 'just one piece of an overall strategy to make work 
more attractive than welfare," with other elements including "child care, an in-
crease in the minimum wage, health insurance for people leaving welfare and 
transportation to help people get to their jobs"). There is some academic sup-
port for this view. See, e.g., Lawrence F. Katz, Wage Subsidies for the Disad-
vantaged?, in GENERATING JOBS: How To INCREASE DEMAND FOR LESS-SKILLED 
WORKERS 21, 46, 49 (Richard B. Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998) (con-
cluding that TJTC may have "modestly improved the employment rates of eco-
nomically disadvantaged youth" and that, although "information/stigma prob-
lems" appear to limit the effectiveness of stand-alone targeted wage subsidies, 
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Other criticisms of the TJTC were not addressed in the new 
proposals297 by virtue of their design as targeted or selective hiring 
credits rather than as general job credits.298 These included prob-
lems of low-income worker displacement (replacing ineligible work-
ers with workers eligible for the credits) or discrimination against 
members of the targeted groups.299 
Congress, on a short-term basis, adopted the WWTC in 1997, 
and has since then renewed it through December 31, 2001.300 Mem-
bers of Congress may have: (1) been persuaded by heavy interest 
group lobbying to reenact the programs in the face of serious ques-
tions about their effectiveness;301 (2) favored the programs as a sym-
bolic gesture, signaling their concern about these employment 
wage subsidies for less skilled workers such as welfare recipients "are likely to 
be more effective when utilized in conjunction with labor market intermediaries 
that help provide some training, placement services, and job retention assis-
tance"). 
297. See JOINT EcoNor.nc Co:MM. WWTC REPORT, supra note 292, at Execu-
tive Summary, 1 (concluding that "[i]t is unlikely that the proposed differences 
between the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit and its predecessor 'viii effectively ad-
dress the shortcomings of the earlier plan" and that "the proposed plan may 
create other problems and inefficiencies which are common to targeted tax 
credits of its kind"). 
298. The former New Jobs Credit was designed as an incremental credit tied 
to a general increase in the employer's workforce. In contrast, the TJTC, which 
was a targeted or categorical hiring subsidy, was designed to provide an incen-
tive for employers to hire from certain low-skilled, hard-to-place groups. See 
discussion supra in Part III.A; supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
299. See Alstott, supra note 286, at 1038-39, 1041 (discussing problems of 
displacement and stigma). 
300. The Welfare to Work Tax Credit (I.R.C. § 51A (Supp. IV 1998)), was en-
acted by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 80l(a), 111 Stat 
788, 869-71. It was extended until December 31, 2001, by the Ticket to Work 
and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 505, 113 
Stat. 1860, 1921. 
301. See generally Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Ac-
celerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 
926-27 (1987) (applying a public choice model to the tax legislative process). 
The primary lobbying support for the employment tax credits has been 
from certain large employers and management assistance companies that proc-
ess the paperwork. See CRS EMPLOYMENT TAX CREDIT REPORT, supra note 295, 
at 'j[ 19 (identifying sources of lobbying pressure in favor of the WOTC, includ-
ing management assistance companies that help businesses "screen job appli-
cants for credit eligibility and complete required paperwork," which are believed 
to "play a considerable role" in lobbying for the credit); id. 'lI 19 n.19 (stating 
that state officials, such as the National Governors' Association, "ended its 
summer 1999 annual meeting by passing a resolution to lobby the Congress for 
a multi-year extension of the WOTC"); Ben Wildavsky, Taxation: Taking Credit, 
29 NAT'L J. 610 (1997) (describing the lobbying effort behind the WOTC by rep-
resentatives of management assistance and consulting firms that help large 
companies secure the required certifications and manage the IRS and Labor 
Department filings, and also "by large employers in the restaurant, retail, hotel, 
nursing home," and chicken processing industries). 
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problems and the need for some type of governmental response;302 (3) 
determined as a policy matter that improved subsidies could provide 
some modest improvements in wage or employment levels for mem-
bers of targeted groups and, thus, were worth enacting if combined 
with other job assistance programs;303 or (4) viewed the credit as a 
tax decrease that would limit the size of government.304 A combina-
tion of these reasons, and perhaps others, may have led to reenact-
ment and extension of the subsidies despite the criticism. Certainly 
welfare reform politics and lobbying by employer groups played a 
significant role. 
2. Delivering the Subsidy Through the Income Tax System 
Once Congress opted to provide the subsidies, why provide them 
through the tax system? The answer ideally depends upon an as-
sessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of using the 
tax system as a delivery mechanism. The primary disadvantages 
relate to tax system complexity and other administrative concerns 
identified by tax expenditure theorists.305 On the one hand, a tax-
delivered benefit does not permit the same degree of agency discre-
tion or supervision, for example, as a direct grant program. 306 On 
the other hand, the tax system may generally provide some advan-
tages as a delivery mechanism for an employment subsidy, particu-
larly if a large number of the employers are small to mid-sized busi-
nesses.307 Businesses file income tax returns on an annual basis and 
smaller businesses generally may be more accustomed with the tax 
system than with special employment programs offered by the De-
302. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study 
of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 47-50 (1990) (stating that legislation, even if ineffective, makes 
people believe their needs are being met). See generally, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, 
THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 43 (1967) (arguing that "political activities ... 
require the most exhaustive scrutiny to ascertain whether their chief function is 
symbolic or substantive"). 
303. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
304. Elimination of employment subsidies may not necessarily result in a 
general tax rate reduction, even a very modest one. Members of Congress 
might eliminate employment subsidies but substitute or expand another more 
popular tax expenditure. Alternatively, advocates for low-income workers and 
their communities might be successful in convincing Congress to adopt alterna-
tive tax or spending proposals aimed at increasing the earnings or employment 
oflow-income workers. Nevertheless, enactment of a tax expenditure is viewed 
by some as a limitation on the size of government because it inhibits the growth 
or enactment of direct expenditure programs. On an individual taxpayer level, 
of course, the credit results in a tax reduction for the eligible employers. 
305. See discussion supra in Part II.B.2.b. 
306. See BUDGET OF THE U.S. GoVERNMENT FOR FISCAL 1999 (Feb. 2, 1998), 
reprinted in Tax Expenditures Chapter from the President's Fiscal 1999 Budget, 
78 TAX NOTES 911, 935 (1998); see also supra note 200. 
307. See Efficiency and Income Taxes, supra note 153, at 1033-35. 
2000] REINVENTING TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 815 
partment of Labor or other government agencies.308 The administra-
tive costs may thus be lower. In addition, business owners may be 
more likely to participate in a tax credit program that reduces their 
tax liability than in a "government subsidy'' program to hire certain 
workers. Any of these factors might justify using the tax system as 
a means of delivering the subsidy to employers rather than using a 
grant program to provide either workers or their employers with 
wage subsidies. In addition, past practice and familiarity may argue 
for not changing the delivery mechanism that has been used in the 
past.so9 
However, the record of past programs casts doubt on these as-
sumptions about the advantages of using the tax system in this con-
text. Historically, employment tax credits have suffered a track rec-
ord of poor participation rates.310 Preliminary information on the 
WWTC and the WOTC suggest that the experience under the most 
recent version of these employment tax credits may not be much dif-
ferent. 311 Furthermore, some preliminary data from empowerment 
308. See id. at 1011-12. 
309. See id. at 1034. 
310. A recent analysis of employer wage subsidies summarizes information 
available on participation rates for various programs. The New Jobs Tax Credit 
subsidized an estimated 1.1 million employees in 1977, and 2.15 million in 
1978. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 296, at 30; see also 1986 TREASURY 
EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES REPORT, supra note 294, at 5 (estimating the total 
budgetary cost of the two-year NJTC as $9.7 billion). The Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit covered a peak of 622,000 workers in 1985 (approximately 0.4 percent of 
private employment) and then declined to 364,000 in 1992, with revenue losses 
of about $500 million (in 1991 dollars) in the mid-eighties, declining to $245 
million in 1991. See Katz, supra note 296, at 32-33. Under the WIN tax credit 
program, which had low utilization rates, "no more than 20 percent of the WIN 
individuals known to have entered employment during the year were ever 
claimed by firms as tax credits." Id. at 29. According to a study done in the 
seventies, the WIN tax credit was paid on only 88,000 workers in fiscal 1973-75 
out of 515,000 WIN enrollees who entered the labor market in that period. 
About $9 million was credited against taxes in fiscal 1973, although part of the 
credit was for jobs that were later decertified because the employees were not 
retained for the required period of time. See Daniel S. Hamermesh, Subsidies 
for Jobs in the Private Sector, in CREATING JOBS: PUBLIC EMPLOYl\lENT 
PROGRAMS AND WAGE SUBSIDIES 87, 95 (John L. Palmer ed., 1978). In 1980, 
WIN tax credits were claimed for less than 10% of all new WIN registrants, and 
the annual revenue loss attributable to the WIN credit was $60 million in fiscal 
year 1981. See 1986 TREASURY EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES REPORT, supra note 294, 
at 19. 
311. See CRS EMPLOYl\lENT TAX CREDIT REPORT, supra note 295, at 'lI'lI 29-32 
(stating that, in fiscal year 1999, state employment security agencies issued 
335, 707 WOTC certifications to employers and 104,998 WWTC certifications 
and reporting that corporate employers claimed about $138 million in WOTC 
credits on 1997 tax returns and individuals claimed $15 million on 1997 re-
turns). Compare JCT T&X EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2000-2004, supra 
note 248, at 21 tbl.1 (projecting revenue losses of approximately $400 million 
from corporations and $100 million from individuals in 2000 for the WOTC, and 
revenue losses of approximately $100 million from corporations and less than 
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zones show that utilization rates of employment tax credits tends to 
be highest among larger businesses,312 suggesting that the advan-
tage of using the tax system to reach small and mid-sized businesses 
may be overstated. Given the role of the employment security agen-
cies in the certification process, the administrative costs generated 
by that participation,313 and the greater past utilization of employ-
ment credits by large businesses, these tax credit programs may be 
relatively easily substituted by direct grant programs. 
In sum, although the weight of evidence does not support pro-
viding employment subsidies through the tax system rather than 
through direct government grants, they remain in the code. As dis-
cussed in Part II.C, budget procedures tend to point advocates for 
subsidies toward using the tax code. Thus, given a pragmatic bot-
tom-line objective to enact some type of subsidy rather than none, 
subsidies tend to remain in the code even if a direct expenditure 
program has design advantages.314 
3. Providing the Subsidy on a Time-Limited Basis 
As noted earlier, members of Congress may act for a range of 
reasons in providing tax expenditures on a time-limited basis.315 
Reasons in this case may range from a public-spirited desire to 
evaluate the program "improvements" before making them perma-
$50 million from individuals from the WWTC), with ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, 
in BUDGET, FY 2001, supra note 5, at ch. 5, at 110 & tbl.5-1 (estimating total 
revenue losses in 2000 from corporate and individual returns of $455 million for 
the WOTC and $60 million for the WWTC). 
312. A recent GAO survey of the utilization of employment tax credits (in-
cluding the Empowerment Zone Employment Credit, the Work Opportunity 
Credit, and the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit) and other tax incentives in nine 
empowerment zones found that large businesses (having 50 or more employees) 
had the greatest utilization rates. The GAO surveyed 2400 businesses and re-
ceived responses from 48% of the large urban businesses, 32% of the small ur-
ban businesses, and 46% of the rural businesses. Of those responding, the 
empowerment zone employment credit was used by 42% of large urban busi-
nesses, an estimated 6% of small urban businesses, and 32% of rural busi-
nesses. Among rural businesses, about two-thirds of the large businesses and 
about one-third of the small businesses reported using the credit. Large urban 
businesses and rural businesses reported claiming $9.1 million for tax year 
1997. See GAO, BUSINESSES' USE OF EMPOWERMENT ZONE TAX INCENTIVES, 
GAO/RCED-99-253, at 2, 6-11 (Sept. 30, 1999). Most empowerment zone busi-
nesses did not use the WOTC or the WWTC (tax year 1997); however, those 
that did tended to be large businesses. Specifically, 11 % of the large urban 
businesses and 14% of the large rural businesses used the WOTC as compared 
\vith an estimated 1 % of the small urban businesses and 3% of the small rural 
businesses. By contrast, 3% of the large urban businesses, no small urban 
businesses, and 1 % of the rural businesses used the WWTC. See id. at 18. 
313. Spending by the employment security administration on the two pro-
grams has been $20 million per fiscal year. See CRS EMPLOYMENT TAX CREDIT 
REPORT, supra note 299, at 'l[33. 
314. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
315. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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nent,316 to rent-extracting legislative behavior317 or the realpolitik of 
congressional budget rules, which encourage the enactment of tax-
delivered programs and make the revenue effects of time-limited 
provisions easier for the tax-writing committees to offset under the 
paygo budget process.318 
The questions above, and possible alternative answers to them, 
loom large in considering what legislative reforms may be possible 
or desirable as we enter a period of nominal budget surpluses. The 
next part of the Article addresses the insights the employment sub-
sidy example may provide about the prospects of reinventing the 
legislative reforms urged by tax expenditure analysts. 
IV. REINVENTING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF FUNCTIONALLY 
RELATED PROGRAMS 
The employment subsidy example discussed above confirms 
many of the problems experienced in the past with tax expenditure 
reforms, including the inherent limitations of relying on increased 
information or automatic review points.319 Congress imposed termi-
nation dates on both the WOTC and the WWTC when it enacted 
them in 1996 and 1997, respectively, but it has already extended 
these credits several times for additional expiring terms.320 Al-
though the credits did not receive a performance review prior to 
each extension, Congress considered information about the perform-
ance of predecessor credits when the credits were enacted under 
their new "welfare reform" nomenclature.321 In the absence of inte-
grated procedures for review by both the tax-writing committees and 
the substantive committees having jurisdiction over employment 
programs, the automatic review points for the credits did not prompt 
316. See Glenn, supra note 231, at 1009-10. 
317. See generally Doemberg & McChesney, supra note 301. 
318. See Harnessing Politics, supra note 51, at 507-14. 
319. See supra text accompanying note 184. 
320. See supra notes 235-36 (discussing enactment and extension dates of 
WOTC and WWTC ). 
321. See Harnessing Politics, supra note 51, at 567-68 (noting the experience 
with the TJTC, observing that "[p]rocedural frameworks cannot dictate the con-
tent of congressional deliberation; they can only help to give members the op-
portunity to deliberate and to increase the chance that voters will be able to 
hold their representatives accountable," and arguing that the paygo procedures 
operate as a surrogate for institutionalized tax expenditures review). The 
automatic expiration dates for WOTC and WWTC have not resulted in a sub-
stantive review of the credits by the Treasury, the Department of Labor, or by 
Congress prior to extension. This may also reflect another trend in the tax leg-
islative process. Professor Garrett has recently argued that a shift in power 
from the committees to the congressional leadership may decrease the amount 
of deliberation by the tax-writing committees and others. The Congressional 
Budget Process, supra note 203, at 726 (providing examples, including the om-
nibus bill enacting the 1997 budget compromise, which included a section ex-
tending a set of expiring tax provisions that had not gone through the revenue 
committees). 
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an effective comparison of the credits with alternative direct 
spending programs. 
For the reasons discussed in Part II, an integrated program-
matic review has been nearly impossible to achieve in the tax legis-
lative process under current congressional rules and structures. 
Similar problems have prevented coordinated review by Congress of 
numerous employment programs funded through the authorization 
and appropriations process (involving many different committees 
and subcommittees) and implemented by many separate executive 
agencies and departments.322 
The fact that termination dates do not accomplish the type of 
review advocated by tax expenditure theorists reflects realities of 
the legislative process quite difficult to alter.323 This Part considers 
what the employment subsidies illustration tells us about prospects 
for more meaningful review of tax expenditures and related direct 
expenditure programs under emerging Results Act reforms. 
A Performance Measurement 
Under the OMB framework, the performance review of tax ex-
penditures is done by the Treasury, submitted to the OMB as part of 
the budget process, and then to Congress as part of the president's 
proposed budget.324 As part of the process, both the Internal Reve-
322. See, e.g., GAO, MULTIPLE EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS: 
INFORMATION CROSSWALK ON 163 EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS, 
GAO/HEHS-95-85FS, 1, 6-34 (Feb. 14, 1995) (reviewing 163 employment pro-
grams and funding streams, including tax credit programs, that provide about 
$20 billion in employment training assistance administered by at least 14 dif-
ferent executive departments and independent agencies, including, among oth-
ers, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Health 
and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development, as well as the De-
partment of Labor); GAO, MULTIPLE EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS: MAJOR 
OVERHAUL NEEDED TO REDUCE COSTS, STREAMLINE THE BUREAUCRACY, AND 
IMPROVE RESULTS, T-HEHS-95-53 (Jan. 10, 1995) (discussing the problems with 
the current "fragmented" system of federal employment training assistance and 
concluding that a major overhaul and consolidation of the programs is needed); 
GAO, MULTIPLE EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS: OVERLAP AMONG PROGRAMS 
RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT EFFICIENCY, GAO/HEHS-94-193 (July 11, 1994) 
(summarizing the unsuccessful efforts made to address overlap issues). See 
generally Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies'' in the Na-
tional Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 244 n.1 (1969) (criticizing the "idealization 
of the appropriations process that has become so congenial to tax commenta-
tors"). 
323. See supra Parts II.B-C. 
324. As part of the management mission of its five-year strategic plan, pre-
pared as required by the Results Act, Treasury announced a goal to improve 
program performance, and set forth its plan of reporting on the yearly progress 
toward that objective in the annual budget process. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 1997-2002, at app. A, Treasury's Strategic 
Management Process, Planning, Budgeting, and Reporting Cycle (Sept. 30, 
1997), available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/gpra/strat.pdf>. The Treasury's 
annual Results Act performance plans and progress reports have been pre-
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nue Service ("Service") and the Treasury plan to develop and report 
data on the "outputs',:325 and "outcomes',:326 of various tax expenditure 
programs. 327 
Both the framework for analysis and the data needed for as-
sessment would have to be developed for each specific tax expendi-
ture; such a task would strain resources and staff unless done in-
crementally.328 For some tax expenditures with social objectives, the 
sented as part of its annual budget submission since fiscal year 1997. DEP'T OF 
THE TREAsURY, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 1, 3 (re-
porting in a "stand-alone" report, issued as a companion report to Treasury's FY 
1999 Accountability Report, that Treasury met 121 of the 186 performance tar-
gets that were quantitative and objectively measurable at the end of the fiscal 
year and that it "continues to refine its measures to make them more useful in 
the decision malting process, and continues to strive to improve the timeliness 
and accuracy of its information systems that capture and report performance 
data"). But see GAO, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY'S 
FISCAL YEAR 1999 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2001 PERFORMANCE 
PLAN, GAO/GGD/AIMD-00-231R (June 30, 2000) (commenting, at the request of 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, on key outcomes identified as 
important mission areas for the agency). 
325. In its framework for evaluating tax expenditures, OMB describes "out-
puts" as "quantitative or qualitative measures of goods and services, or changes 
in income and investment, directly produced by ... inputs [in the case of ta'{ 
expenditures, tax revenue loss is the principal input]." 1997 OMB RESULTS ACT 
REPORT, supra note 80, at IV. 
326. OMB describes "outcomes" as "the changes in the economy, society, or 
environment that are the ultimate goals of programs." Id. For example, for an 
investment incentive, "an increase in the amount of investment might be a key 
output" and the "resulting production from that investment, and the associated 
improvements in nationiitincome, welfare, or security, could be the outcomes of 
interest." Id. 
327. OMB notes that, for tax provisions intended to address a potential in-
equity or unintended consequence in the code, "an important performance 
measure might be how they change effective tax rates (the discounted present-
value of taxes owed on new investments or incremental earnings) or excess bur-
den (an economic measure of the distortions caused by taxes)." Id. In addition, 
"distributional effects" could be an important concern for some tax provisions. 
See id. See generally, e.g., GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, 
MANAGING FOR RESULTS: ANALYTIC CHALLENGES IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE, 
GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138at14-18 (1997) (describing generally the difficulties in 
defining and measuring program-specific outcomes). 
328. Difficult measurement problems can distract agencies from the overall 
goals of performance management. As one commentator has cautioned, the 
"biggest mistake in pursuing performance-based management is to conceive of 
performance as primarily a measurement problem." KETTL, supra note 7, at 47. 
He argues instead that it is about political communication, a "way to talk better 
about what results government programs produce and, therefore, to make bet-
ter decisions about what ought to be done, how much ought to be spent in doing 
it, and how the work could be done better." Id. Performance measures "should 
be limited to those that relate to strategic organizational goals and objectives, 
and that provide timely, relevant and concise information for use by decision-
makers at all levels to assess progress toward achieving predetermined goals." 
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, SERVING THE AMERICAN PuBLIC: BEST 
PRACTICES IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, BENCH1\1ARKING STUDY REPORT 3 
820 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Treasury would need to consult with experts in other agencies be-
fore constructing performance measures. Although the Service 
compiles return statistics, it does not routinely collect program per-
formance data. The performance review structure would require the 
Service to respond with "outputs" and "outcomes" along with agen-
cies responsible for related discretionary spending programs, mak-
ing the Treasury and the Service more accountable to the OMB and 
to Congress for the "programs" it administers. 
How, if at all, would the performance measurement and re-
porting requirements have changed the evaluation of the employ-
ment tax credits described in Part III? First, it is not clear that 
there would have been a significant difference in the level of infor-
mation available on program effectiveness even if the Treasury's Re-
sults Act framework for evaluation of tax expenditures had been fur-
ther developed at the time that the WWTC and WOTC were enacted 
and extended. Because of the long history of targeted employment 
tax credits, the Treasury, the Department of Labor, and academic 
investigators have periodically studied their effectiveness. Although 
the data tended to focus on simple program output measures, such 
as program participation rates, they also included more complex 
measures, such as follow-up information about the longer term em-
ployment and wage levels for program participants.3w Although 
such performance information was available for evaluation of the 
employment tax credit programs, comparable data would not be 
readily available for many other programs delivered through the tax 
code. The Results Act performance measurement requirements will 
likely produce useful program performance data on programs that 
have not been studied in the past. i 
Despite the relative availability of output data on employment 
subsidies,330 the ability of the data to show "outcomes" has been 
(June 1997). The NPR defines performance measurement as follows: 
A process of assessing progress toward achieving pre-determined 
goals, including information on the efficiency with which resources are 
transformed into goods and services (outputs), the quality of those 
outputs (how well they are delivered to clients and the extent to which 
clients are satisfied) and outcomes (the results of a program activity 
compared to its intended purpose), and the effectiveness of govern-
ment operations in terms of their specific contributions to program 
objectives. 
Id. at6. 
329. See, e.g., TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 294, 
at 16-32. 
330. In some cases, appropriate output measures for social programs can be 
quite difficult to determine. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 411-12 (using the 
example of social security disability benefits and concluding that "[d]eciding 
who meets the eligibility criteria for disability payments is an interpretive en-
terprise whose quality and legitimacy must be evaluated more by the inputs-
substantive standards, evidentiary rules, fact-gathering routines, justification 
requirements, quality checks, and appeal rights-than by the outputs"). 
2000] REINVENTING TAX EXPENDITURE REFORM 821 
quite limited because of certain inherent measurement problems. 
As discussed in Professor Alstott's analysis of the economics of em-
ployment subsidies, it is very difficult to isolate the impact of the 
subsidies from more generalized economic trends.331 Thus, from an 
empirical standpoint, it may not be possible to measure "outcomes" 
from employment subsidy programs in any meaningful way. That 
type of difficulty with establishing "outcomes" will continue to be a 
problem under the Results Act performance review structure. 
In some cases, as discussed above, the difficulty in selecting ap-
propriate outcome measures and analyzing their results stems from 
an attempt to "influence complex systems or phenomena whose out-
comes are largely outside government control."332 In other cases, the 
federal agencies do not directly manage programs but instead pro-
vide funds in complex partnerships with others to provide services 
or programs, such as with private contractors, state agencies, or 
nonprofit organizations.333 The outcomes of these programs may be 
beyond the control of federal agency managers.334 The success of the 
employment tax credit programs, for example, depends upon com-
plex relationships among federal agencies, including the Treasury, 
the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and, with 
state employment offices, private employers and their employees. 
Determining how to hold federal employees accountable for out-
comes under such circumstances will be quite difficult. 
In sum, the technical and managerial problems in attempting to 
measure outcomes are considerable. For these reasons, other coun-
tries in the process of implementing performance-based manage-
ment and budgeting systems have tended to focus primarily on "out-
put" measures for performance review of social programs.335 
B. Performance Management and Budgeting 
Gaps in performance data, discussed above, may also draw new 
attention to gaps in tax expenditure management and oversight. 
The reporting process could put pressure on the Treasury and the 
331. Alstott, supra note 286, at 1031-42. 
332. GAO, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: ANALYTIC CHALLENGES IN MEAsURING 
PERFORMANCE, GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, at 30 (1997) (suggesting in response 
that performance measurement data be supplemented by impact evaluation 
studies and systematic evaluation of how a program was implemented). 
333. See KETTL, supra note 7, at 47-48. 
334. One suggested way of addressing this dilemma is to begin by developing 
a system for measuring outputs (for purposes of shaping managers' behavior) 
and then to move toward assessment of outcomes for purposes of policymaking 
decisions. See id. at 47-49. 
335. See, e.g., GAO, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: EXPERIENCES ABROAD SUGGEST 
INSIGHTS FOR FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS, GAO/GGD-95-120, at 4 (1995) 
(describing the output-oriented approach of New Zealand and the United King-
dom, and observing that even though Australia and Canada take an outcome-
oriented approach, the measures used in performance reports tend instead to 
focus on outputs). 
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Service to manage-these programs more actively if they are formally 
incorporated into their performance plans. Therefore, the Results 
Act should, over time, prompt preparation of new information about 
the effectiveness of programs. 
By raising the bureaucratic stakes, the expansion of tax expen-
diture analysis from its current role in budgetary analysis to a new 
management and assessment role puts additional pressure on the 
controversial definitional and measurement issues underlying tax 
expenditure theory. Categorizing a tax provision as a tax expendi-
ture would determine the applicability of the performance-based 
management and budgeting requirements. Although the defini-
tional issues were briefly mentioned in Part II, they were assumed 
away for purposes of this discussion. Not all definitional issues are 
as clearcut as they appear to be in the employment tax credit con-
text. Some issues are very difficult to resolve and have been highly 
contested, for different reasons, by both tax experts and politicians. 
In addition to focusing greater attention on program definition 
and management issues within the Treasury and the Service, the 
Results Act raises interagency management issues as well as poten-
tial cross-agency budgetary concerns. The missing pieces of the em-
ployment subsidy analysis in Part III that could be provided by the 
Results Act tax expenditure performance review framework are the 
"comparisons of tax expenditures with other means of addressing 
their main objectives or budget functions, such as spending or 
regulatory programs. ,,:ias 
This type of analysis so far has not been a prominent feature of 
the Treasury's performance plans. The GAO evaluation of the 
Treasury's fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2000 performance plans 
found that the Treasury's plans do not consistently include informa-
tion about how the Treasury and the Service plan to coordinate 
cross-cutting agency activities that share common purposes.337 Al-
though it is possible that providing this type of cross-agency and 
cross-budgetary analysis could have made a difference by persuad-
ing Congress to substitute tax subsidies with a direct grant pro-
gram, current congressional structures for committee consideration 
336. 1997 OMB RESULTS Ac:r REPORT, supra note 80, at IV. 
337. The GAO explained its finding as follows: 
[The] IRS, for example, is responsible for administering the tax code 
provisions relating to several billions of dollars of tax expenditures, 
such as the earned income tax credit, the low-income housing credit, 
and the research credit. However, there is no discussion of how IRS 
intends to coordinate with federal agencies that administer related di-
rect expenditure programs to develop performance goals pertaining to 
its responsibilities. 
GAO, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, RESULTS ACT: 
OBSERVATIONS ON TREASURY'S FISCAL YEAR 1999 ANNuAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, 
GAO/GGD-98-149, at 4; see also GAO, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY'S PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, GA0/GGD-99-114R, 
at9. 
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and review make substitution unlikely to happen even if the infor-
mation were available. 
In sum, whether increased performance information leads to 
major changes in program design, to changes in which agency man-
ages them, or eventually to program elimination, primarily depends 
upon Congress. These issues must be addressed and resolved as the 
performance review process matures. The next section briefly sets 
forth the type of congressional response that should be considered as 
a next-stage "reinvention" development. 
C. Congressional Response 
Congress must eventually decide how to respond to the addi-
tional performance information provided by the Treasury about tax 
expenditure programs and by other executive agencies responsible 
for managing direct expenditure programs. Most importantly, Con-
gress must determine whether revised congressional structures will 
be developed to engage in functional budgeting analysis or more sys-
tematic and integrated performance oversight of functionally related 
programs. 
The inadequacy of the current congressional structures to deal 
with the type of performance information that should become in-
creasingly available under the Results Act is illustrated by the expe-
rience 'vith employment subsidies discussed in Part III. Unlike 
many other tax expenditures, the performance of these programs 
has been reviewed by both the executive and legislative branches. 
The executive agencies, at various points, recommended the termi-
nation of employment tax credit programs or otherwise questioned 
their effectiveness after reviewing the programs' performance. 338 Af-
ter a temporary termination, the administration supported revised 
credits, and Congress passed them despite serious questions about 
the corrective effect of the revisions. Thus, an evaluation of the sub-
sidy's effectiveness did occur prior to the enactment of the WWTC 
and WOTC.339 
Despite the initial review of past performance of similar em-
ployment tax credits, Congress did not give any serious considera-
tion to providing the subsidies directly, rather than through the tax 
system, or in consolidating the assistance with existing jobs pro-
grams. No current congressional structure facilitates such an 
analysis, even under Results Act reforms. Although the Results Act 
provides a reporting mechanism to support a comparative analysis 
of alternative program delivery vehicles, it does not address the 
more basic structural obstacles to reform. 
As discussed in Part II.A, the GAO tax expenditure study con-
cluded that integrated reviews of functionally related programs 
338. See supra note 294. 
339. See discussion supra in Part III.D.1 (reviving employer wage subsidies). 
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would more likely be achieved through an executive branch coordi-
nation effort than through changes in congressional procedures.340 
The Results Act offers one such executive branch approach. Addi-
tional reforms, aimed at achieving more integrated analysis of al-
ternative program funding mechanisms, could be attempted as part 
of the president's annual budget submission. However, if Congress 
ever comes to a consensus about the need to evaluate program per-
formance and to eliminate program overlap and inefficiency, it must 
restructure its own procedures. 
As mentioned earlier, congressional committees now review 
agency performance plans as part of the Results Act oversight proc-
ess. 341 Nevertheless, existing committee structures offer little oppor-
tunity for coordinated review of cross-agency programs in related 
functional areas. More fundamental structural reforms are needed. 
In recent testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, the 
U.S. Comptroller General compared the current performance over-
sight environment to that of the budget environment of thirty years 
ago, prior to the creation of the Budget Committees and the congres-
sional budget resolution to coordinate the budgetary activities of 
congressional committees.342 He urged Congress to "consider 
whether a more structured oversight mechanism is needed to permit 
a coordinated congressional perspective on government[-hvide per-
formance matters," with one possible approach being a modification 
of the budget resolution to include such a perspective. 343 
This type of coordination effort and other potential responses 
should be explored in the coming years if Congress is to achieve a 
meaningful review of program management and budgetary perform-
ance. Incorporating performance review coordination instructions 
into the congressional budget process would increase the influence 
of the budget committees and further lessen the autonomy of the 
tax-writing and appropriations committees, continuing a shift in in-
fluence that has occurred gradually over the last twenty-five to 
thirty years. However, in the absence of a program management 
crisis analogous to the federal deficit crisis, the development of a 
program oversight coordination role for the budget committees could 
require a level of political consensus beyond the current capacity of 
Congress. 
Without ways to achieve congressional committee coordination, 
however, important program oversight issues will remain unad-
dressed. The challenge for the future under the Results Act will be 
how Congress responds to the performance information provided by 
340. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
342. See GAO, TESTIMONY BEFORE COMM. ON BUDGET, U.S. SEN., BUDGET 
ISSUES, GAO/T-AIMD-00-73 at 22 (Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of David M. Walker, 
Comptroller General of the United States). 
343. Id. 
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the Treasury and other executive agencies in the budget and pro-
gram oversight process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Results Act creates an executive branch framework to pro-
vide Congress with information about the performance of federally-
funded programs. The reporting framework could lead to more 
meaningful review by Congress of a broad range of functionally re-
lated government programs, whether delivered directly by govern-
ment employees or indirectly through alternative delivery mecha-
nisms. To achieve that end, however, the framework must apply to 
all federally-funded program activities, whether funded and imple-
mented via direct expenditures, tax expenditures, or as regulatory 
programs. Ensuring comprehensive coverage is, thus, an important 
first step toward reform. 
The Results Act framework, if comprehensively applied, pro-
vides a new opportunity to address the management and oversight 
problems posed by the use of tax expenditures as alternatives to di-
rect expenditure programs. Tax expenditure theory and its progeny, 
a series of tax expenditure budgets issued over the last thirty years, 
have served an important public policy function by providing legisla-
tors with information about the budgetary role of certain revenue-
losing tax provisions. Tax expenditure theorists have also provided 
a conceptual framework and argument for more systematic review 
by Congress of tax expenditures as spending programs. To accom-
plish such review, they have suggested the use of automatic review 
points (sunset provisions) and other legislative reforms. Over the 
years, however, the tax expenditure oversight aspects of their legis-
lative reform agenda have encountered significant institutional ob-
stacles. Most of these reforms were never fully implemented, and 
the ones that have been enacted provided little political constraint 
on the use of tax expenditures. 
That experience provides important lessons about the prospects 
for more meaningful review of both tax expenditures and direct ex-
penditures under the Results Act. The transformation of tax expen-
diture analysis-from primarily a budgetary information function 
into a program management assessment tool-will be quite difficult 
to accomplish, but it has already begun under the government-wide 
performance review process developed pursuant to the Results Act. 
The agency performance measurement and reporting process 
should, over time, generate useful information about the "output" of 
a broad range of programs, including previously unexamined tax ex-
penditures. Program performance information may less likely be 
used as a budget dodge than mechanical rules like sunset provi-
sions. Most importantly, once available, the information coordi-
nated by the o:rv.rn as part of the budget process will give policymak-
ers an opportunity to evaluate program effectiveness within the 
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context of other programs within the same budget function. 
Recent experience with two expiring employment tax credits, 
the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit (''WWTC") and the Work Opportu-
nity Tax Credit ("WOTC"), however, highlights some of the limita-
tions of relying exclusively on an executive branch coordination ef-
fort to accomplish more effective legislative oversight. Although the 
visibility, impermanence, and detailed eligibility provisions of the 
employment tax credits approach an appropriations-type model, pe-
riodic review and extension of these provisions by the tax-writing 
committees have not resulted in the type of programmatic review 
contemplated by reformers. The lack of integrated review in these 
particular cases does not derive from a lack of transparency or a 
dearth of data; instead, it represents, depending upon your view of 
the legislative process, either "business as usual" or a structural 
failure to consider tax system and direct spending alternatives as 
part of a coordinated program review process. 
As we enter a period of budget surpluses and modification of the 
paygo budgetary regime, it is time to evaluate whether the move-
ment toward results-oriented management and oversight of gov-
ernment programs could lead to more fundamental structural re-
forms by Congress. If fully implemented, the Results Act 
performance information framework could present Congress with an 
opportunity to develop more coordinated legislative procedures, 
through the budget resolution or some other procedure, to improve 
oversight of functionally-related government programs. Whether 
the executive and Congress will sustain this movement remains to 
be seen. If so, the question of whether Congress will create effective 
structures to respond to the program and budget information pro-
vided by the executive branch under the evolving Results Act 
framework remains a central challenge for the future. 
